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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation consists of five published articles and working papers that deal with three
major areas of economics using agent-based computational (ACE) methods: The first two
articles (chapters 2 and 3) develop agent-based models to analyze the interaction between the
real and financial sector and derive optimal policy reactions. The third article (chapter 4)
presents a minimal agent-based model of the macroeconomy. Articles four and five (chapter
5 and 6) deal with simple models of the banking sector as well as optimal banking regulation.
Chapter 2
In this chapter, we combine a simple agent-based model of financial markets with a New Key-
nesian macroeconomic model that is characterized by bounded rationality instead of Rational
Expectations. The two employed submodels are simple representatives of their respective dis-
cipline. Interaction between the two is brought about by straightforward channels. The result
is a macroeconomic model that allows for the endogenous development of business cycles and
stock price bubbles. We also analyze the impact of different types of financial transaction
taxes that are currently debated among policy makers: A financial transaction tax (FTT) in
the spirit of Tobin (1978)1, a financial activities tax (FAT) which is analogous to a value-added
tax, and a progressive version of the FAT.
The main findings are the following. We show that market sentiments of both, the real and
financial sector, exert important influence on the macroeconomy: Impulse-response functions
of macroeconomic variables become more volatile which makes the effect of a given shock more
difficult to predict. With respect to financial taxation, we find that all considered taxes are
well suited to stabilize the economy and raise funds from the financial sector as a contribution
to the enormous costs created during the recent crisis. Our simulations suggest that the FTT
leads to higher tax revenues and better stabilization results then the FAT. However, the FTT
might also create huge macroeconomic distortions if set too high, a threat which the FAT
does not imply. Furthermore, we have shown that the optimal decision of making the FAT
flat or progressive is depending on the tax rate. For values below 11% the progressive version
1The list of references for each article is attached at the end of each chapters right after the corresponding
conclusions.
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is the best choice, while for rates above 40% the flat tax version is preferable. In between,
the progressive tax leads to better stabilization while the flat tax generates more revenue.
The chapter is based on a joint article with Hans-Werner Wohltmann which was published
as ”Agent-Based Financial Markets and New Keynesian Macroeconomics: A Synthesis” in
the Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, April 2013, Volume 8, Issue 1, pp.
1-32. My contribution consists of the entire programming as well as substantial parts of the
literature research and theoretical model development.
Chapter 3
This chapter further develops the model of article one. In a first step we simplify the real
sector submodel and correct some minor inconsistencies of the underlying De Grauwe (2010a)
model. Secondly, we use a strict microfoundation approach to derive a generalized IS-equation
which gives rise to new interactive channels. In a third step we perform a detailed stability
analysis of the interactive channels. Finally, we derive optimal monetary policy rules of the
Taylor type under a set of different regimes: For example, we change the central bank’s (CB)
objective function by additionally taking financial market volatility into account. Additionally,
we discuss the question whether optimal monetary policy should be forward- or backward-
looking. Finally, we allow the CB to perform direct purchases of financial assets and derive
the corresponding optimal unconventional (simple) rule.
Our most important findings are the following. The stability analysis yields ambiguous
results. One channel is clearly destabilizing both, the real and financial sector. For the
other channels, results either differ for both sectors (i.e. stabilizing one while destabilizing the
other) or they change significantly with the set channels that are active. In some regimes,
the interactive channels strongly feed back on each other and even yield explosive dynamics.
Our analysis on optimal monetary policy shows that the coefficients of optimal simple Taylor
rules do not significantly change if financial market stabilization becomes part of the CB’s
objective function. We find that the CB’s response to inflation decreases slightly if financial
market stability enters its objective. Another interesting result is that the optimal reaction
to deviations of inflation from the target becomes weaker, the higher the degree of interaction
between the financial and real sector. Additionally, we show that the policy rule should depend
on contemporaneous values of output and inflation, if it reacts to lagged values instead, the
economy is strongly destabilized. Additionally we analyze the importance of unconventional
monetary policy instruments and find that they increase welfare only marginally in comparison
to conventional policy.
The chapter is based on the joint article with Hans-Werner Wohltmann ”Optimal Monetary
Policy in a New Keynesian Model with Animal Spirits and Financial Markets” published as
Economics Working Papers 2014, 12, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of
Economics. My contribution consists of the entire programming as well as substantial parts
of the literature research and theoretical model development. The microfoundation (outlined
in detail in appendix 3.8.1) was derived by Hans-Werner Wohltmann alone.
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Chapter 4
This chapter presents a baseline agent-based macroeconomic model and contrasts it with the
common dynamic stochastic general equilibrium approach. It is argued that its advantage over
standard theory is the possibility of emergent phenomena and endogenous business cycles. The
ACE method also provides a deeper way of microfoundation because it can strictly abandon
any top-down assumption. E.g. market equilibrium is not assumed, but shown to emerge
endogenously from the micro level. Thus, the method also allows for richer market dynamics:
In the general equilibrium world, trade only takes place after the auctioneer has calculated
the equilibrium price vector. In reality, however, prices are a result of the market mechanism
and not its precondition (Kirman (2006) and Gaffeo et al. (2007)). Rationality assumptions
(rational choice and rational expectations) are replaced by heuristics that real human beings
would be able to apply. Furthermore, the model is validated since it reproduces a number of
empirical facts.
It is demonstrated that agent-based modeling is an adequate response to the recently ex-
pressed criticism of macroeconomic methodology because it provides a solution to the above
mentioned problems of DSGE theory. Additionally, it is capable of reproducing a lot of the
stylized facts of business cycles. The developed model is simpler than other ACE competi-
tors in the field of macreconomics and solves all of the above mentioned issues of standard
macroeconomic theory more rigorously.
The chapter is based on my single-authored article ”Agent-Based Macroeconomics: A
Baseline Model” in the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, February 2013,
Volume 86, pp 102-120.
Chapter 5
This chapter presents a simple agent-based, stock flow consistent model that covers the mon-
etary side of transactions among households, firms and banks. All agents follow very simple
behavioral rules. The resulting model is well suited to explain money creation in line with the
standard theory of fractional reserve banking. Instead of enforcing an equilibrium by assump-
tion, we show that it emerges endogenously from individual interactions in the long run. The
model is therefore a generalization of standard theory. It is novel to the approach that indi-
vidual interactions also create an interconnected banking sector which gives rise to systemic
risk and bankruptcy cascades. Financial instability, in this model, is inevitably interwoven
with the creation of money and thus an intrinsic property of modern economies.
It is shown that the existence of an interbank market has a twofold effect: It stabilizes
during normal times but amplifies systemic instability, contagion and bankruptcy cascades
during crises. But even with no interbank market, indirect contagion can lead to bankruptcy
cascades. We identify maturity mismatches between different assets and liabilities as the driv-
ing force that, first, builds up systemic risk and, second, triggers financial crises endogenously.
We also find that the existence of large banks threatens stability and that regulatory policy
should target large banks more strictly than small ones.
The chapter is based on a joint article with Sebastian Krug and Hans-Werner Wohlt-
mann which was published as ”Money Creation and Financial Instability: An Agent-Based
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Credit Network Approach” in the journal Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment
E-Journal, Volume 7, Issue 32, pp 1-44. My contribution consists of the entire programming
as well substantial parts of the literature research and theoretical model development.
Chapter 6
The last chapter deals with the new Basel III accord on banking regulation. With the Basel
III framework, regulators have reacted to the recent financial crisis with, first, a revision of
microprudential instruments and, second, the introduction of several new macroprudential
instruments. This approach of cumulating several requirements bears the risk of single mea-
sures negating or even conflicting with each other, which might lessen their desired effects on
financial stability. Hence, the question arises, whether the concurrent imposition of instru-
ments leads to a regulatory environment in which they (perhaps partially) offset each other’s
individual contribution to financial stability.
We use the model proposed in chapter 5 to provide an impact study of Basel III which
evaluates both, the isolated and joined impact, of most of its instruments. The literature, of
course, has already evaluated most instruments. Unfortunately, most of the available studies
deal with single instruments only, thus providing no insight into potential conflicts between
them. To get the joined impact of several (or all) instruments, one can not simply sum up the
contributions of individual instruments in isolation. Our model allows for the simultaneous
imposition of several instruments. It also gives rise to the sources of systemic risk (cross
sectional & time varying) that Basel III aims to reduce. Hence, our model is well suited for
an impact study of Basel III.
With respect to microprudential instruments, we find that the positive joint impact of all
instruments is considerably larger than the sum of individual contributions, i.e. the stand-
alone impacts are non-additive. Concerning the macroprudential overlay, the impacts are
either marginal or even destabilizing except for the buffers (CConB and CCycB) which in-
deed represent indispensable instruments to counteract agents’ procyclical behavior. It is
worth mentioning that two instruments contribute most to financial stability: The newly
introduced liquidity coverage ratio (microprudential), and the flexible (i.e. buffered) capital
requirement (macroprudential). Although the leverage ratio embodies a synthesis of both,
non-risk sensitivity and simplicity, it falls short of expectations. The same holds for sur-
charges on systemically important institutions which have a quite moderate standalone and
even destabilizing multi-dimensional impact. Hence, surcharges in their current implemen-
tation only contribute to financial regulations complexity and not to the resilience of the
system.
The chapter is based on a joint article with Sebastian Krug and Hans-Werner Wohltmann
entitled ”The Impact of Basel III on Financial (In)stability: An Agent-based Credit Network
Approach” in Quantitative Finance (forthcoming). My contribution consists of the entire
programming as well as substantial parts of the literature research and theoretical model
development. The extensive literature work on banking regulation in general and the BASEL
III accord in particular was done by Sebastian Krug.
Chapter 2
Agent-Based Financial Markets and
New Keynesian Macroeconomics: A
Synthesis
Published in: Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, April 2013, Volume 8, Issue
1, pp. 1-32
Coauthored by: Hans-Werner Wohltmann
Abstract
We combine a simple agent-based model of financial markets and a New Keynesian macroe-
conomic model with bounded rationality via two straightforward channels. The result is a
macroeconomic model that allows for the endogenous development of business cycles and stock
price bubbles. We show that market sentiments exert important influence on the macroecon-
omy: Impulse-response functions of macroeconomic variables become more volatile which
makes the effect of a given shock hard to predict. We also analyze the impact of different
types of financial transaction taxes that are currently debated among policy makers (FTT,
FAT, progressive FAT) and find that such taxes are well suited to stabilize the economy and
raise funds from the financial sector as a contribution to the enormous costs created during
the recent crisis. Our simulations suggest that the FTT leads to higher tax revenues and
better stabilization results then the FAT. However, the FTT might also create huge distortion
if set too high, a threat which the FAT does not imply.
Keywords: Agent-based modeling, stock market, New Keynesian macroeconomics, financial
transaction tax, financial activities tax
JEL classification: E0, E62, G01, G18
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The full article can ba downloaded via
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11403-012-0100-y
DOI: 10.1007/s11403-012-0100-y
Chapter 3
Optimal Monetary Policy in a New
Keynesian Model with Animal
Spirits and Financial Markets
Published in: Economics Working Papers 2014, 12, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel,
Department of Economics
Coauthored by: Hans-Werner Wohltmann
Abstract
This paper relates to the literature on macro-finance-interaction models. We modify the
boundedly rational New Keynesian model of De Grauwe (2010a) using a completely micro-
founded IS equation, and combine it with the agent-based financial market model of Westerhoff
(2008). For this purpose we derive four interactive channels between the financial and real
sector where two channels are strictly microfounded. We analyze the impact of the different
channels on economic stability and derive optimal (simple) monetary policy rules. We find
that coefficients of optimal simple Taylor rules do not significantly change if financial market
stabilization becomes part of the central bank’s objective function. Additionally, we show
that rule-based, backward-looking monetary policy creates huge instabilities if expectations
are boundedly rational.
Keywords: Agent-based financial markets; New Keynesian macroeconomics; microfoundation;
optimal monetary policy; unconventional monetary policy
JEL classification: E03, E5, G02
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3.1 Introduction
The financial crisis of 2008 has put new issues on the economics research agenda. Recently,
a growing literature investigates how speculative phenomena in financial markets spill over
to the real economy and whether or not real market developments feed back on financial
speculation. One straightforward way to answer such questions is to integrate the standard
New Keynesian macroeconomic (NKM) model with those of the agent-based computational
(ACE) finance literature.
Early attempts in this area are Kontonikas and Ioannidis (2005) and Kontonikas and Mon-
tagnoli (2006) who connect a New Keynesian Macroeconomic (NKM) model with a financial
market (FM) model where stock prices result from two different sources: a momentum-effect
and a reversal towards the fundamental value. Those models are clearly inspired by the
agent-based (chartist/fundamentalist) literature1 on financial markets. A similar approach
can also be found in Bask (2011). The major drawback of these models is the lack of a
consistent approach of expectation formation. The Rational expectations (RE) hypothesis
which is standard in macroeconomics is kept for the NKM part while financial markets are
driven by non-rational expectations that are implicitly contained in the behavior of chartists
/ fundamentalists (compare Brock and Hommes (1998) for example).
Some interesting work in the macro-finance-interaction literature that does not build upon
NKM for the description of the real sector has been done by Westerhoff (2012) and Naimzada
and Pireddu (2013). The authors employ a classical Keynesian demand function only to
represent the real sector. The advantage of this approach is simplicity. Models are typically
of small scale, so that analytical solutions are tractable. This simplicity however comes at the
cost of a non-microfounded, ad-hoc real economy.2
In a series of papers Paul DeGrauwe3 has proposed to replace the assumption of rational
expectations in standard NKMs by an evolutionary learning approach. Following the ACE-
FM literature (e.g. Beja and Goldman (1980)), agents in his model apply different forecasting
heuristics and adjust their believes by ex post evaluation. His approach provides a perfect real
sector submodel to an integrated (i.e. macro-finance-interaction) model framework because
it allows to state both submodels using identical expectations hypothesis. A first approach
to integrate NKM of the DeGrauwe type with ACE financial markets has been proposed by
Lengnick and Wohltmann (2013). The authors put a Westerhoff (2008) model alongside the
DeGrauwe NKM and introduce two different interaction channels.
In the paper at hand we will further develop this approach in the following way. In section
3.2 we will derive an extended version of the IS-curve that gives rise to new interactive channels
with the financial sector. In section 3.3 we will adjust the expectations heuristics of the real
sector subsystem and define the macro-finance-interaction model. The role of the different
1A litereture overview can be found in Samanidou et al. (2007), an empirical model contest in Franke and
Westerhoff (2012). For illustrative examples on exchange rate modeling consult De Grauwe and Grimaldi
(2005) and Bauer et al. (2009).
2A new literature designs agent-based macroeconomic models as object oriented simulations without the
need for any equation system. Consult Lengnick (2013) for a simple example and Dosi et al. (2010) for a very
elaborate, policy oriented one.
3De Grauwe (2010a), De Grauwe (2010c), De Grauwe (2010b).
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channels on (in)stability is evaluated in section 3.4. In section 3.5 we derive optimal simple
monetary policy rules of the Taylor-type and discuss the question whether they should be
forward- or backward-looking. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Microfounding an Extended IS-Curve
One important aspect on the research agenda to integrate NKM with ACE finance is the
identification of the most important channels through which the different sectors influence
each other. Several channels have been proposed, but all of them share two common problems:
First, the interactive channels are not microfounded or empirically identified but assumed ad
hoc. Second, the literature has not agreed upon which channels are most important.
Typical assumptions for possible channels which affect the real sector from within the fi-
nancial one are, (1) the existence of wealth effects (Kontonikas and Montagnoli (2006), Bask
(2011), Westerhoff (2012), Naimzada and Pireddu (2013)), (2) a collateral based cost ef-
fect (Lengnick and Wohltmann (2013)) or (3) a balance-sheet based leverage targeting effect
(Scheffknecht and Geiger (2011)). Typical examples for channels going in the opposite di-
rection are (1) a misperception effect (Kontonikas and Montagnoli (2006), Westerhoff (2012),
De Grauwe and Kaltwasser (2012), Lengnick and Wohltmann (2013), Naimzada and Pireddu
(2013)), (2) a negative dependence on the (real) interest rate (Kontonikas and Montagnoli
(2006)), or (3) a mixture of both (Bask (2011)).
But even if the same type of channel is applied, its formalization is often very different. The
wealth effect, for example, is formalized in Kontonikas and Montagnoli (2006) and Westerhoff
(2012) by adding +c1sq to aggregate demand, where c1 is a positive parameter and sq the
(log) stock price in period q. On the other hand, Bask (2011) adds real stock price changes
+c1(∆sq − πq), where πq is the inflation rate. Naimzada and Pireddu (2013) add a weighted
average of the current and fundamental stock price +c1
[
(1− ω)sf + ωsq
]
where ω is the
weight and sf the fundamental value of sq.
4 In the remainder of this section, we will derive
channels that follow from a strict microfoundation approach, to check which of the above
mentioned channels and formalizations are in line with first order principles.
In NKM, money is typically introduced by assuming that holding money generates utility
for the household. To introduce stocks within the NKM microfoundation framework, we
proceed analogously and assume that holding stocks creates utility in just the same way.
Following Gali (2008, p. 27-32) the household’s period utility function is given by
U(Cq, Dq, Nq) =
Z1−σq
1− σ
−
N1+ηq
1 + η
(3.1)
with Zq being a composite index defined as:
Zq =
[
α1C
1−ν
q + α2D
1−ν
q
] 1
1−ν (3.2)
4Compare Kontonikas and Montagnoli (2006), eq. (3); Westerhoff (2012), eq. (2.3); Bask (2011), eq. (1);
Naimzada and Pireddu (2013), section 2.1.
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In the remainder of this paper we will call this approach stock in non-separable utility [SINU].
Consumption is given by Cq, labor supply by Nq and the amount of stock demand by Dq.
Utility is maximized with respect to the budget constraint:
Cq +
SqDq
Pq
+
Tnq
Pq
+
Bq
Pq
=
Wq
Pq
Nq +
(
d˜q−1 + Sq−1
) Dq−1
Pq
+ (1 + iq−1)
Bq−1
Pq
(3.3)
Sq denotes the stock price, T
n
q nominal taxes, Bq bonds demand, Pq the goods price and d˜q−1
is the dividend payment per stock. The costs of current (real) stock demand
SqDq
Pq
appears on
the left hand side of (3.3) while the (real) worth of past stock demand plus (real) dividend
receipts
(
d˜q−1 + Sq−1
)
Dq−1
Pq
is added to the right hand side. It is assumed that dividend
payments d˜q−1 are earned by firms in q− 1 and distributed to households at the beginning of
period q.
Solving the above optimization problem for an infinitely lived household yields the stock
demand function5
dq = xq − c3(sq − pq)− c4iq (3.4)
where lower case letters denote log differences, i.e. relative deviations from steady state. In-
terpretation of the dependencies of dq is straightforward: (1) The demand for stocks increases
if an agent can afford higher consumption (which results in a higher output gap xq). (2)
The higher the real price of stocks sq − pq, the lesser its demand. (3) dq also depends on
bond yields iq, because bonds are a substitute for stocks: If bonds demand becomes more
profitable, stock demand would decrease. Note that stock demand does not (directly) depend
on the expected stock price change between q and q + 1 because households’ behavior is not
driven by a speculative motive of stock demand.
The extended IS curve becomes
xq = Eq [xq+1]−
1
σ
(iq − Eq [πq+1]) + c1 · Eq [∆sq+1 − πq+1] + c2 · Eq [∆iq+1] + ǫ
x
q (3.5)
with the two new (positive) constants c1 and c2. A detailed derivation can be found in
appendix 3.8.1. The interpretation of (3.5) is again straightforward and closely follows Gali
(2008, chapter 2.5.2). In the case of expected (real) stock price increases (Eq [∆sq+1 − πq+1] >
0), households expect future (real) stock prices to be higher than today. Hence, they expect
lower stock demand for the future compared to today (dq+1 < dq, see eq. (3.4)). Consequently,
marginal utility of future consumption is lower than of current consumption. To smooth
marginal utility of consumption in q and q + 1, current consumption is increased. The same
rationale holds for the expected change in government bond yields. If iq is expected to rise
(Eq [∆iq+1] > 0) future stock demand is expected to be lower than today (dq+1 < dq) which
(as above) leads to increased current consumption and output.
Given the assumptions on the wealth effect of other authors (discussed above), we can
conclude from this section that Bask (2011) was closest to a channel that is in line with utility
5Compare appendix 3.8.1 for a detailed derivation.
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optimizing behavior although he had a slightly different timing (+c1(∆sq − πq) instead of
+c1 · Eq [∆sq+1 − πq+1]).
3.3 The Model
One problem that has to be solved when joining a NKM model with an ACE-FM is that both
are developed to run on different time scales because transactions in financial markets take
place in much smaller time intervals (compared to the real market).6 Time indices in the
NKM represent quarters, while in ACE-FM they are interpreted as days.
To allow for a meaningful integrated model, we have to make sure that both submodels
still run on the time scale they are designed for. For this purpose we assume that the financial
market performs 64 increments of the time index t within one increment of the real market’s
time index q (figure 3.1). Quarter q consists of the days7 t = 64(q − 1) + 1, ..., 64q.8
Figure 3.1: Time scale; indexed by days t and quarters q
3.3.1 Real Sector
The real sector of our integrated model consists of a Taylor rule, an inflation equation of the
Phillips-type and our extended IS-Curve (3.5). To be able to compare the model to others in
the literature9 we also allow for a cost effect (−κsq) in the Phillips Curve:
πq = βE˜q [πq+1] + γxq − κsq + ǫ
π
q (3.6)
The Taylor rule is depending on expected future inflation rate and output gap:10
iq = δπ
(
E˜q [πq+1]− π
⋆
)
+ δxE˜q [xq+1] + ǫ
i
q (3.7)
The quarterly value of stock prices is given by the average of the corresponding daily values:11
sq =
1
64
64q∑
t=64(q−1)+1
st (3.8)
6Algorithmic trading, for example, which is typically of a very short-term intra-daily nature already accounts
for up to 60% of financial market trasactions (Matheson (2011)). Such high frequencies are unusual for
transactions of the real economy, e.g. labor is bought for at least one month. Consult also the approach of
Franke and Sacht (2014) and Ahrens and Sacht (2014).
7It is assumed that trading does not take place on weekends.
8Lengnick and Wohltmann (2013), section 2.
9Compare literature overview in section 3.1.
10We relax this assumption in section 3.5.
11Compare Lengnick and Wohltmann (2013), eq. (24)
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Alternatively, one could assume decaying weights to account for the fact that recent informa-
tion has a stronger influence on traders than older information. It has been shown that the
model outcome is robust against this assumption.12
Expectations are formed in a boundedly rational way using discrete choice learning. For
the output gap the set of heuristics is given by:
Targeters: E˜
tar
q [xq+1] = x (3.9)
Static exp.: E˜
sta
q [xq+1] = xq−1 (3.10)
Extrapolaters: E˜
ext
q [xq+1] = xq + αx · [xq − xq−1] (αx > 0) (3.11)
Compared to the original De Grauwe model, we assume a different set of expectations that
is more in line with those typically assumed in ACE-FM.13 Additionally, we do not assume
a hybrid form for the IS- and Phillips-Curve, because the boundedly rational expectations
approach (especially static exp.) already gives rise to persistence in line with the rule-of-
thumb idea. A hybrid form is therefore not necessary any more.14
A further advantage of our specification is that the special case of full price flexibility is
still included in the model, while the original DeGrauwe model becomes explosive for high
degrees of price flexibility. The NKM is derived by introducing real rigidities into the Real
Business Cycle (RBC) model. Therefore, the RBC model is still incorporated in the NKM as
a special case. This aspect is important conceptually and should also hold for a boundedly
rational version of the NKM (compare appendix 3.8.5 for further details on this and other
advantages of our specification).
For inflation, heuristics are given by:
Targeters: E˜
tar
q [πq+1] = π
⋆
q (3.12)
Static exp.: E˜
sta
q [πq+1] = πq−1 (3.13)
Extrapolaters: E˜
ext
q [πq+1] = πq + απ · [πq − πq−1] (απ > 0) (3.14)
Depending on their past performance, measured by the mean squared forecast error (MSFE),
each forecasting heuristic j ∈ {tar, sta, ext} is ascribed a level of attractivity
Ay,jq = −
(
yq−1 − E˜
j
q−2 [yq−1]
)2
+ ζAy,jq−1 y ∈ {x, π} (3.15)
12Compare Lengnick and Wohltmann (2013), section 2 of online appendix.
13Compare, for example, the model of Westerhoff (2008) or De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) which is based
on Brock and Hommes (1998). For an alternative approach where chartism is based on a moving average rule
consult Chiarella et al. (2006).
14Introduction of hybridity into the baseline NKM is typically justified (microfounded) by assuming habit
formation (Ravn et al. (2010), Smets and Wouters (2007)) or rule-of-thumb (Amato and Laubach (2003))
behavior. The BR expectations of DeGrauwe clearly fall in the second category because, first, they yield the
same result on the aggregate level (i.e. persistence) and, second, they follow the four criteria (compare Amato
and Laubach (2003) and Menz (2008)) for rule-of-thumb behavior: (1) They are applied if RE induce too high
costs. (2) The orientation variable should be easily observable by the agents. (3) Calculating forecasts should
involve virtually no computational burden. (4) Agents should learn, and learning algorithms should make sure
that individual choices have converged once a steady state is reached.
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with the memory parameter ζ. The fraction of agents ωy,iq applying heuristic i is given by a
discrete choice model
ωy,jq =
exp{φAy,jq }
exp{φAy,tarq }+ exp{φA
y,sta
q }+ exp{φA
y,ext
q }
(3.16)
and market expectations are given by the weighted average:
E˜q [yq+1] = Σjω
y,j
q E˜
j
q [yq+1] (3.17)
De Grauwe points out15, that agents do not use heuristics (instead of RE) ”because they
are irrational, but rather because the complexity of the world is overwhelming” that ex ante
calculation of mean time paths is impossible. Therefore, ”heuristics [are] a rational response
of agents who are aware of their limited capacity to understand the world”. In the remainder
of the paper we will denote this response boundedly rational [BR] to distinguish it from strict
RE.
To keep the model simple, we do not add a set of heuristics and a discrete choice learning
model for interest rate expectations of eq. (3.5), but only use static expectations: E˜q [iq+1] =
iq. The solution of our real sector model is then given by (compare appendix 3.8.2)
(
xq
πq
)
= A−1q Cq
(
xq−1
πq−1
)
+A−1q Dq · sq +A
−1
q Fq · sq−1 +A
−1
q
(
σǫxq − ǫ
i
q
ǫπq
)
(3.18)
with the time dependent matrices:
Aq =
(
σ − (σ − δx)ω
ext
x,q (1 + αx)− σc1ω
tar
s,qh −(1− δπ − σc1)ω
ext
π,q(1 + απ)
−γ 1− βωextπ,q(1 + απ)
)
Cq =

 (σ − δx)(ωhabx,q − αxωextx,q ) (1− δπ − σc1)(ωrofπ,q − απωextπ,q)
0 β
(
ωrofπ,q − απω
ext
π,q
)


Dq =

 c1σ
(
ωexts,q (1 + αs)− 1
)
−κ

 Fq =

 c1σ
(
ωstas,q − αsω
ext
s,q
)
0


3.3.2 Financial Sector
We use the model of Westerhoff (2008) for the financial sector of our economy.16 In this
section, we will shortly describe the original Westerhoff model. Afterwards it will be adjusted
to allow for interactions with the real economy.
15De Grauwe (2010b), p. 415.
16We decided to use this model because because of its straightforward assumptions and implementation. The
model is also empirically validated and has successfully been used for policy analysis. For alternative models
compare Dieci and Westerhoff (2010) or Tramontana et al. (2013). An interesting example on a much debated
policy issue can be found in Westerhoff and Dieci (2006).
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In this model, agents learn from a set of two different rules:
Chartists: E˜
C
t [st+1] = st + k
C [st − st−1] (3.19)
Fundamentalists: E˜
F
t [st+1] = st + k
F
[
sft − st−1
]
(3.20)
Chartists belief in a continuation of the recently observed stock price trend while fundamen-
talists expect a reversal towards the fundamental value sft . For both groups j, the excess
demand for stocks Djt positively depends on the direction of the expected stock price change:
Djt = ℓ
(
E˜
j
t [st+1]− st
)
+ ǫjt j ∈ {C,F} (3.21)
Note that the above equation denotes excess demand of institutional investors of the finan-
cial market, while the completely microfounded eq. (3.4) denotes households’ demand. The
fractions of agents W jt applying the different strategies j are determined by a discrete choice
model. In addition to strategies C and F , Westerhoff (2008) also allows a ’no trading’-strategy:
W jt =
exp{eAjt}
exp{eACt }+ exp{eA
F
t }+ exp{eA
0
t }
j ∈ {C,F, 0} (3.22)
Ajt is the attractivity of strategy i that is determined as a function of past profits (cf. eq.
(3.15)):
Ajt = (exp{st} − exp{st−1})D
j
t−2 +mA
j
t−1 (3.23)
The parameterm ∈ (0, 1) determines the memory of traders and the attractivity of no trading
is normalized to A0t = 0 (i.e. no profits). Price adjustment is given by a price impact function
st+1 = st + a
(
WCt D
C
t +W
F
t D
F
t
)
+ ǫst (3.24)
that relates stock price changes positively to excess demand
(
WCt D
C
t +W
F
t D
F
t
)
. The random
term ǫst denotes the influence of trading strategies other than j ∈ {C,F, 0}.
Impacts from the Real Sector For the first interactive channel, we follow Kontonikas
and Montagnoli (2006), Westerhoff (2012), De Grauwe and Kaltwasser (2012), Lengnick and
Wohltmann (2013)17 and Naimzada and Pireddu (2013) by assuming, that the perceived
fundamental value sft is biased in the direction of the recent real economic development:
18
sft = h · xq q = floor
(
t− 1
64
)
, h ≥ 0 (3.25)
The completely microfounded stock in non-separable utility [SINU] approach gives rise to
a second channel because households’ demand for stocks (eq. (3.4)) has to be added to the
demand of institutional investors of the financial market model (eq. (3.24)). If we assume
17Compare eq. (26) in Lengnick and Wohltmann (2013).
18The floor function in eq. (3.25) rounds a number down to the next integer.
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Figure 3.2: Real- and Financial Sector Interactions (Channels)
that households’ (quarterly) demand for stocks is distributed evenly among the 64 days of
the quarter, we have to add 164∆dq to stock demand such that the price impact function
becomes:19
st+1 = st + a
(
WCt D
C
t +W
F
t D
F
t +
k
64
∆dq
)
+ ǫst (3.26)
The parameter k is introduced as a generalization that allows to vary the intensity of the
channel. For k = 0 the channel disappears.
3.3.3 Financial and Real Sector Interaction
In total, we have four channels through which the financial and real sector could impact each
other (fig. 3.2): Channels I and II that are in line with the literature, but assumed ad hoc,
and channels IIIa and IIIb that are newly introduced by the microfounded SINU approach.
The economic rationale of channel I is that the nominal value of financial assets owned
by firms increases when stock prices are rising. Firms’ production is largely financed by
credit. If their asset side of the balance sheet increases this leads to a rise in their credit
worthiness and credit rating. Consequently, they have access to cheaper credits (compare
Minsky (1986)). Hence, their costs of production fall which leads to lower prices. Channel IIIa
results from intertemporal utility optimization of households. If households expect increasing
real stock prices, they also expect falling marginal utility of consumption for the next period.
Intertemporal utility smoothing makes them increase consumption today.
Channel II goes in the opposite direction and can be interpreted as follows. The true
fundamental value of a given stock is hard to identify in reality (compare Rudebusch (2005),
Bernanke et al. (1999)). If the true value of sft is unknown, agents have to form assumptions
about it. In our model they use proxies like the recent economic development. If output
is high, they assume the fundamental value to be high and adjust their demand for stocks
accordingly. The fourth channel, ch. IIIb, also results from the microfounded SINU approach.
According to eq. (3.4), stock demand increases if (1) output increases, (2) the real stock price
19Note that stock prices react to excess demand which is given by ∆dq, not dq.
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decreases, or (3) the nominal interest rate decreases. In all three cases, increasing demand
will drive stock prices upward.
The intensity of each channel is given by the corresponding interaction parameters κ (Chan-
nel I), h (II), c1 (IIIa) and k (IIIb). In the special case of κ = h = c1 = k = 0 the two
submodels operate in isolation.
3.4 Stability Analysis
In this section we are going to determine for each channel whether it is stabilizing or destabi-
lizing the economy. For this purpose, we will vary the interaction parameters κ, h, c1 and k
on an interval from zero (i.e. no interaction) upwards. All other parameters are kept constant.
We report them in table 3.1 and keep them as our baseline parameterization throughout the
entire paper. The impact on (in)stability of the real sector is measured by a typical cen-
tral banks’ loss function which is given as a weighted sum of the unconditional variances of
inflation and output:20
Real Sector: Lr = var(π) +
1
2
var(x) (3.27)
The interpretation of (3.27) is that volatile goods price inflation and production are associated
with utility losses, where output stabilization is weighted half as much as price stability.
Similarly, we set up a loss function for the financial sector
Financial Sector: Lf = var(s) (3.28)
that associates volatile daily21 stock prices with losses.
Table 3.1: Baseline parameterization
Real sector Financial sector
Structure Learning Noise Structure Learning Noise
σ = 1.0 ζ = 0.5 σǫ = 0.15 ℓ = 1 k
C = 0.04 σC = 0.05
β = 0.99 φ = 10 a = 1 kF = 0.04 σF = 0.01
γ = 0.33 αx = απ = 0.2 e = 300 σs = 0.01
δx = 0.5 m = 0.975
δπ = 1.5
Source: The Financial market parameterization is identical to Westerhoff (2008). The structural
parameters of the real sector are standard in NKM (compare Gali (2008)): σ = 1.0 gives rise to log
utility, β = 0.99 yields a steady state interest rate of about 4%. γ = 0.33 follows if a unitary Frisch
elasticity, a markup of 20%, constant returns to scale and price stickiness of θ = 0.67 are assumed. For
the NKM learning parameters we follow De Grauwe (2010a,b,c) and Lengnick and Wohltmann (2013).
For the new extrapolative heuristic, we assume a positive but mild trend extrapolation of 0.2.
20Compare e.g. Svensson (2003).
21Recall that daily stock prices are given by st, while quarterly are given by sq.
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Figure 3.3: (De)stabilization of real submodel. Light gray areas denote parameterizations
that yield high loss values (i.e. low welfare), while dark gray areas denote low losses. White
areas, on the contrary, denote explosiveness.
To evaluate the effect of the four different interactive channels on economic stability, we
proceed as follows. First, we pick pairs of two interaction parameters with opposed direction.22
Second, we run the model for different values of the interactive parameters and for different
realizations of the noise terms (ǫiq, ǫ
x
q , ǫ
π
q , ǫ
s
t ) ∀ q, t. Finally, we compute the average loss
values (eq. (3.27) and (3.28)) for a given parameterization which yields (approximately) the
theoretical values Lr and Lf .
23
In fig. 3.3 we illustrate the stabilization impact on the real sector. White areas (in the
north-east) denote parameterizations for which no stable solution exists, i.e. the generated
trajectories diverge/explode. Gray areas denote parameterizations that are non-explosive
and the darkness indicates the corresponding loss value. The darker a region, the lower
the associated loss Lr. The corresponding results for financial sector stabilization (Lf ) are
displayed in figure 3.4.
22For example, the parameter pair (κ, h) constitutes one channel that effects the financial sector from within
the real sector and one channel of the opposite direction.
23This procedure is related to the approach of Naimzada and Pireddu (2013) who also vary the interaction
parameter (ω in their paper) to analyze stability. But instead of a loss function, the authors use bifurcation
plots to illustrate stability impacts.
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Figure 3.4: (De)stabilization of financial submodel. Light gray areas denote parameterizations
that yield high loss values (i.e. low welfare), while dark gray areas denote low losses. White
areas, on the contrary, denote explosiveness.
Channel I (κ) The influence of κ on welfare is clearly negative for both, the real and
financial subsystem. For a given h or k, an increase of κ leads to higher loss values. For
h > 0.45 or k > 0.14 it even gives rise to explosive developments. E.g. if, in the top left panel
of fig. 3.3, we fix h = 0.2 and let κ increase from 0 upwards, we successively reach areas of
higher Lr (i.e. higher loss/volatility, lower welfare). If we fix h = 0.8, the system even becomes
explosive (i.e. no stable trajectory) as soon as κ > 0.12.
The economic explanation for this explosive behavior is straightforward. If stock prices
increase, inflation will fall due to (negative) cost effects (eq. (3.6)). Lower inflation leads
to lower inflation expectations (eq. (3.14)) and therefore also to an increase in output (if
the extended Taylor principle δπ > 1 + σc1 holds). The rising output creates a feedback
mechanism that drives stock prices up further, no matter which of the opposing channels (II
or IIIb) is active. If channel II is active (h > 0), a higher perceived fundamental value leads
to higher demand for stocks (eq. 3.25), while if channel IIIb is active (k > 0), households
directly demand more stocks (eq. 3.4) which drives prices up.
Channel II (h) For parameter h we find somewhat ambiguous results. Financial markets
are always destabilized (for I and IIIa being the opposing channel). For sufficiently large κ,
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an increase in h could even lead to explosive behavior. With respect to the real sector the
results are not as clear. In combination with a significant strength of channel IIIa (c1 > 0.1),
increasing values of h are stability neutral w.r.t. Lr, while for c1 < 0.1 a rise in h increases
stability. In combination with channel I, higher h lead to more stable developments at first.
If, however, h is increased above a certain threshold, the model suddenly becomes explosive.
Channel IIIa (c1) Results for c1 are again ambiguous. When combined with channel
IIIb, the impact of higher c1 is stabilizing for both, the real and the financial sector. When
combined with channel II, higher values of c1 are only stabilizing the real sector but are almost
neutral with respect to the financial one.
The economic intuition behind these results is the following. If channels IIIa and IIIb
are active, an increase in output leads to higher stock demand of households (eq. (3.4)) and
therefore higher stock prices. Through channel IIIa (eq. (3.5)), output depends positively on
the expected future change in stock prices (E˜q [∆sq+1] = E˜q [sq+1]− sq). Higher stock prices
(sq), therefore negatively effect output which dampens the original effect and stabilizes the
economy.
If IIIa is combined with II one would expect the same results, since channel II (just as
IIIb) positively relates stock prices to output development (eq. (3.25)). Channel II, however,
depends on market sentiments: Only if the fraction of fundamentalists in the financial market
is significantly high, we could expect the misperception effect (channel II) to have a significant
impact. Obviously, this dependence on market sentiments weakens the stabilizing effect of
larger values of c1: Only for c1 < 0.12 we find a positive stabilization for both markets, while
for c1 > 0.12 only the real sector is stabilized by further increases of c1.
Channel IIIb (k) The stability impact of k also depends on the active channels: In com-
bination with channel I, channel IIIb has a stabilizing effect on the real market as long as k is
sufficiently small. At the same time, it has a destabilizing effect on the financial sector. If k is
increased by too much, however, the model dynamics become explosive (compare explanation
under paragraph ’channel I (κ)’).
In combination with channel IIIa, results are very different. Higher values of k have a pos-
itive impact on real sector stability but only for low values of c1. Financial market stability,
in contrast, is monotonically decreasing.
In a last step, we check whether the stabilizing effect of one channel could counteract the
destabilizing effect of other channels by so much that a formerly explosive parametrization
becomes unexplosive. As an example, we pick the parameter combinations (h = 0.8, κ = 0.25)
or (k = 0.25, κ = 0.25) which both yield explosive dynamics (figure 3.4, top left and top right).
If, additionally to these two channels, we set c1 = 0.15 the model becomes stable again in
both cases. Increasing c1 therefore shifts the unstable (white) region outwards.
From this section we can conclude that there is no easy answer to the question whether
interaction between financial markets and the real economy is stabilizing or destabilizing. The
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results depend strongly on the channels under consideration. Hence, future research has to
clarify which of the proposed channels is most relevant empirically.24
3.5 Optimal Monetary Policy
In this section we will derive simple optimal policy rules for the central bank. In subsection
3.5.1 we derive optimal values for the Taylor parameters δπ and δx under different types of
policy rules and for different objective functions. In subsection 3.5.2 we analyze whether
monetary policy should optimally be forward- or backward-looking.
3.5.1 Optimal Simple Rule
We use the Taylor rule (3.7) and define the optimal simple rule [OSR] as the central banks’
reaction (δ⋆π, δ
⋆
x) that yields the minimal loss value. In analogy to the previous section, we
derive (δ⋆π, δ
⋆
x) as the minimizers of the average loss value over different realizations of the
noise vector (ǫiq, ǫ
x
q , ǫ
π
q , ǫ
s
t ) ∀ q, t:
(δ⋆π, δ
⋆
x) = arg min
δpi ,δx
Lr (3.29)
In this context, two straightforward questions arise in our interactive model: Does the presence
of a financial sector change the optimal policy rule? If it does, to what extend do the different
interactive channels matter?
To answer these questions, we are going to perform the optimization (3.29) for different
cases: On the one hand, we assume different objective functions for the central bank. In a
first setting we assume the typical form of a loss function where only the stability of the real
subsystem is taken into account:
Real sector only: Lr = var(π) +
1
2
var(x) (3.30)
In a second scenario we also add financial market stability var(s) with a relatively smaller
weight:
Real & fin. sector: Lr+f = var(π) +
1
2
var(x) +
1
10
var(s) (3.31)
Given this loss function the central bank tries to stabilize inflation with highest priority,
followed by output and by stock prices with least priority.
On the other hand, we also vary the set of interactive channels that are operating: we start
with no channels, continue with all possible pairs of two channels of opposite direction, and
end by activating all channels simultaneously. The resulting optimal values (δ⋆π, δ
⋆
x) are given
in table 3.2.
The first interesting result is that, if the central bank additionally aims to stabilize fi-
nancial markets, it should less strongly react to variations in inflation (δ⋆π) while reaction to
24Estimation of ACE models is relatively involved so that we have to leave this issue for future research.
Compare Franke (2009) and Franke and Westerhoff (2012) on the estimation of ACEs.
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Table 3.2: Optimal simple rules for different channels and objective functions.
Parameterization of channels: κ = 0.100, h = 0.500, c1 = 0.200, k = 0.200.
Channels Real Market Real & Fin. Market
none δ⋆π = 3.47 δ
⋆
x = 1.29 δ
⋆
π = 3.47 δ
⋆
x = 1.29
I & II δ⋆π = 3.44 δ
⋆
x = 1.28 δ
⋆
π = 3.42 δ
⋆
x = 1.28
IIIa & II δ⋆π = 3.18 δ
⋆
x = 1.25 δ
⋆
π = 3.16 δ
⋆
x = 1.25
I & IIIb δ⋆π = 3.45 δ
⋆
x = 1.27 δ
⋆
π = 3.43 δ
⋆
x = 1.27
IIIa & IIIb δ⋆π = 3.26 δ
⋆
x = 1.27 δ
⋆
π = 3.24 δ
⋆
x = 1.27
all δ⋆π = 3.10 δ
⋆
x = 1.18 δ
⋆
π = 3.06 δ
⋆
x = 1.18
variations in output is unchanged. This result is closer examined in table 3.3 which shows
the percentage change in both, the policy coefficients (δ⋆π, δ
⋆
x) and in the volatility measures
(var(π), var(x), var(s)) that occur in the OSR if the CB minimizes Lr+f instead of Lr. For
all channel parameterizations, the CB achieves a decrease in the volatility of x and s by ac-
cepting an increase in var(π). The reason is that both channels (II & IIIb) that affect the
financial sector are directly related to the output gap x. Stabilizing x therefore also indirectly
stabilizes the financial market. This explains the CB’s higher interest for output stabilization
(which also decreases var(s)).
To bring these results about, the CB has to lessen its reaction towards inflation (decrease
in δ⋆π; table 3.2, second column) no matter which channels are active. The change in optimal
reaction towards output is ambiguous: If the strongly destabilizing channel I (compare section
3.4) is active, δ⋆x increases (table 3.2, third column). If channel IIIb (that weakly stabilizes
the real sector; sec. 3.4) is active, δ⋆x is decreased instead. This change in optimal reaction
parameters, however, is very small and irrelevant for most practical considerations.
Table 3.3: Percentage change in OSR policy coefficients and
in volatility measures if CB switches from Lr to Lr+f .
Policy Coefficients Volatility Measures
Channels δ⋆π δ
⋆
x var(π) var(x) var(s)
none 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
I & II -0.56% +0.05% +0.46% -0.50% -0.08%
IIIa & II -0.60% +0.41% +0.51% -0.53% -0.08%
I & IIIb -0.58% -0.04% +0.47% -0.51% -0.08%
IIIa & IIIb -0.55% -0.12% +0.40% -0.43% -0.07%
all -1.39% +0.40% +1.14% -1.18% -0.37%
Another robust finding is, that the central bank’s reaction becomes weaker, the more
interactive channels exist. Policy reaction is strongest, if no channel is active at all. If two
channels of opposite direction are added, the policy reaction becomes weaker. If all channels
are active simultaneously, the central bank’s intervention is decreased further. This is not
caused by the interactive channels alone stabilizing the economy and making stabilization
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policy by the CB superfluous. On contrast, the loss values monotonically increase the more
channels are taken into account (compare first column of tab. 3.4). Instead, the interactive
channels make the economy harder to control, therefore CB policy is less efficient and has to
be reduced. This finding is robust across both objective functions (Lr and Lr+f ) as well as
different weights25 within the objective function.
3.5.2 History-dependent or Foreward-looking?
It is known that an inverse relationship exists between the forward-/backward-lookingness of
optimal monetary policy and that of the underlying model: The more forward-looking the
model becomes, the more backward-looking monetary policy should be and vice versa.26
Our boundedly rational model was originally composed in a forward-looking way (eq. (3.6)
and (3.5)). However, the boundedly rational character of expectations makes the model de-
pending on past variables (eq. (3.18)) and therefore backward-looking. The question therefore
arises whether monetary policy should optimally be forward- or backward-looking, or some-
thing in between.
To answer this question, we derive the (expected) loss values Lr that correspond to the
optimal simple rule under three different scenarios: In scenario one, monetary policy depends
on expectations only (compare eq. (3.7)):
iq = δπ
(
E˜q [πq+1]− π
⋆
)
+ δxE˜q [xq+1] + ǫ
i
q
In the second scenario it depends on contemporaneous values
iq = δπ (πq − π
⋆) + δxxq + ǫ
i
q (3.32)
and in a third one it depends on the most recent past:
iq = δπ (πq−1 − π
⋆) + δxxq−1 + ǫ
i
q (3.33)
The resulting minimal loss values Lr are given in table 3.4. The alternative loss definition Lr+f
is given in parenthesis. In analogy to the previous subsection we report values for different
sets of interactive channels.
Smallest loss values result if monetary policy reacts to contemporaneous values of output
and inflation. If it reacts to agent’s expectations instead, loss values increase by about 50%.
This result is again robust across all combinations of interactive channels and different loss
functions. If policy becomes backward-looking, the loss value increases dramatically in the
case of no interaction between the financial and real sector. If interaction is taken into account,
the model even becomes explosive (i.e. Lr →∞ and Lr+f →∞).
25If we change, for example, the weight of output stabilization from 1
2
to 1 (compare Wollmershäuser (2006)),
our results remain qualitatively identical.
26This issue has been extensively discussed in macroeconomics. Consult, for example, Svensson (1997),
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000), Benhabib et al. (2003), Svensson and Woodford (2003), Eusepi (2005) and
Leitemo (2008).
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Table 3.4: Comparison of minimal loss values Lr for forward-looking, contempora-
neous and backward-looking optimal simple rules. Loss values Lr+f in parentheses.
Policy Rule depending on
Channels E˜q [πq+1], E˜q [xq+1] πq, xq πq−1, xq−1
none 0.086 (0.090) 0.039 (0.043) 2.60 (2.61)
I & II 0.088 (0.093) 0.041 (0.046) →∞ (→∞)
IIIa & II 0.090 (0.094) 0.039 (0.044) →∞ (→∞)
I & IIIb 0.088 (0.092) 0.040 (0.044) →∞ (→∞)
IIIa & IIIb 0.087 (0.091) 0.039 (0.043) →∞ (→∞)
all 0.093 (0.098) 0.041 (0.046) →∞ (→∞)
The standard results, mentioned in the beginning of this subsection, are generally con-
firmed in our boundedly rational NKM: The model is de facto backward-looking. Therefore,
monetary policy should depend on information as recent as possible. Since computation of
rational expectations is (by assumption) not possible, the most up-to-date information the
CB can use is given by contemporaneous values. An interesting new aspect is that wrongly
conducted (backward-looking) monetary policy could cause high volatility (large loss values)
although it is strictly rule-based. In the presence of financial markets, such policy could even
create explosive behavior.
To verify these results, we compare the system matrices of the real market subsystem
(h = c1 = 0) for the three policy rules (3.7), (3.32) and (3.33). All system matrices are time
dependent. E.g. for rule (3.7) the system matrix is given by A−1q Cq with Aq and Cq defined
in eq. (3.18).27 In each time step q the fractions of agents ωy,jq using the different heuristics
(i.e. the state of the learning algorithm; (3.15) and (3.16)) are determined by recent economic
development. To get an idea of how often the learning algorithm creates instabilities, we
calculate the eigenvalues [EV] ofA−1q Cq for 47916 different realizations over the entire possible
range of learning states. In figure 3.5 we report the percentage of learning states that result
in an unstable system matrix. Obviously, the probability of becoming explosive is much lower
for Taylor rules depending on contemporaneous or expected future values of π and x. If the
central bank reacts to past values, we observe an increase from about 5% to 55%.
As a second verification, we introduce persistence (interest rate smoothing) into the Taylor
rule
iq = ηiq−1 + (1− η)
{
δπ
(
E˜q [πq+1]− π
⋆
)
+ δxE˜q [xq+1]
}
+ ǫiq (3.34)
where η ∈ (0, 1) determines the degree of persistence or smoothness.28 In figure 3.6 we
illustrate the (expected) loss value Lr as a function of η for different interactive channels.
Smallest loss values result for η ∈ (0, 0.2). For higher η we find exponentially increasing losses.
27Compare appendices 3.8.3 and 3.8.4 for system matrices of rules (3.32) and (3.33).
28This approach is common in the literature. Consult e.g. Clarida et al. (1998) and Clarida et al. (1999).
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Figure 3.6: Effect of interest rate persistence
The result, that backward-looking monetary policy destabilizes the economy is therefore again
confirmed. If a financial sector is active, losses even approach infinity.
As a third verification, we follow Naimzada and Pireddu (2013) by checking if, in a bi-
furcation plot29, the system looses stability earlier if the TR depends on πq−1 and xq−1.
Exemplary30, we show the bifurcation plots of απ (compare eq. (3.14) ) in figure 3.7 for the
three different Taylor rules (3.7), (3.32) and (3.33). For rules depending on expected and
contemporaneous values (panel (a) and (b)) the system looses the unique steady state at
απ ≈ 1.8. If monetary policy becomes backward-looking (panel (c)) the first bifurcation takes
place already at απ ≈ 0.37.
3.5.3 Optimal Unconventional Monetary Policy
Another question that has been debated in the literature31 on optimal monetary policy is,
whether or not the CB should react to over-/under-valuation of financial assets (i.e. bubbles).
This is typically done by adding a stock price reaction term to the Taylor rule, e.g. +δs ·sq. Of
course, we could proceed in a similar way and simply derive the optimal δ⋆s . But the results
of Wollmershäuser (2006) who uses a similar32 NKM without bounded rationality already
suggest that such a welfare increase takes place but is very small.
In light of the policy recently performed by central banks in several advanced countries,
we are going to analyze a slightly different question. Instead of reacting with the conven-
29In the bifurcation plots we show the long run developments of the deterministic core, i.e. all stochastic
terms are set to ǫiq = ǫ
x
q = ǫ
pi
q = ǫ
s
t = 0 ∀ q, t.
30A bifurcation analysis for all relevant parameters can be found in appendix 3.8.5. Here, we consider αpi
only, because all other parameters do not give rise to bifurcations, except for αx, which produces very similar
results to αpi (compare fig. 3.10 in appendix).
31Rudebusch (2005), Kontonikas and Ioannidis (2005), Wollmershäuser (2006), Kontonikas and Montagnoli
(2006) and Castelnuovo and Nistico (2010).
32The model of Wollmershäuser consists of the typical three equation NKM extended by a nominal exchange
rate, where the development of nominal exchange rates is modeled in several alternative ways. In one case it
is given by a simplified chartist-fundamentalist model (eq. (3.4) and footnote 6) similar to our stock market.
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Figure 3.7: Bifurcation plot of parameter απ for different monetary policy rules depending on
different variables
tional instrument only (i.e. the interest rate), we equip the CB with another, unconventional
instrument (i.e. direct purchases of financial assets) and derive the optimal mixture of both.
If the CB’s direct purchases (given by ∆dCBq ) are added to the price impact function (3.26)
in just the same way as the excess demand of households, we get:
st+1 = st + a
(
WCt D
C
t +W
F
t D
F
t +
k
64
·
{
∆dq +∆d
CB
q
} )
+ ǫst (3.35)
The first (conventional) instrument is given by eq. (3.7) while for the second (unconventional)
we assume that direct purchases are proportional to stock price misalignment:
Conventional instrument: iq = δπ
(
E˜q [πq+1]− π
⋆
)
+ δxE˜q [xq+1] + ǫ
i
q
Unconventional instrument: ∆dCBt = δ
d
s ·
(
st − s
f
)
(3.36)
If, for example, the CB buys assets when prices are undervalued and sells when they are
overvalued, we have δds < 0. The optimal (simple) mixture of conventional and unconventional
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instruments is then defined as (compare (3.29)):
(δ⋆π, δ
⋆
x, δ
d,⋆
s ) = arg min
δpi ,δx,δds
Lj j ∈ {r, r + f} (3.37)
The results of the optimization problem (3.37) for conventional versus unconventional policy
are contrasted in table 3.5. We distinguish between the case where th CB only cares for real
sector stability (Lr) and the case where it also cares for financial market stability (Lr+f ).
Table 3.5: Conventional versus unconvenventional monetary policy
Parameterization of channels: κ = 0.1, h = 0.5, c1 = 0.2, k = 0.2
Conventional Unconventional
CB Target δx, δπ δx, δπ, δ
d
s
Lr Lr = 0.064 Lr = 0.062
Lr+f Lr+f = 0.069 Lr+f = 0.062
As expected, the loss value increases in the case of conventional policy, if var(s) is added to
the welfare measure. Compared to conventional monetary policy, unconventional policy leads
to a welfare gain for both welfare measures. This gain is larger, if financial market stability
explicitly enters the loss function. In both cases (Lr & Lr+f ), however, the gain of using
unconventional instruments is very small.
For simplicity we assumed in eq. (3.36) that the CB knows the true fundamental stock
price sf .33 In more realistic settings, where the CB also has to form beliefs about the sf ,
welfare gains might be even lower. Furthermore, we did not consider the presence of zero
lower bound for the interest rate iq. Unconventional instruments might be more influential if
the conventional measures fail.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper extends the work of Kontonikas and Montagnoli (2006), Bask (2011), Scheffknecht
and Geiger (2011), Bask (2011), Westerhoff (2012), Naimzada and Pireddu (2013), and Leng-
nick and Wohltmann (2013). It combines the macroeconomic BR-NKM of De Grauwe (2010a)
with the financial ACE of Westerhoff (2008) by deriving a generalized IS curve that originates
from a non-separable utility function including stocks. This approach gives rise to additional
completely microfounded interaction channels with the financial sector.
Once the model is set up, we perform a stability analysis with ambiguous results. The cost
channel is clearly destabilizing both, the real and financial sector. For the other channels,
results either differ for both sectors (i.e. stabilizing one while destabilizing the other) or they
change significantly with the opposing channel. In some regimes, the interactive channels
strongly feed back on each other and yield explosive dynamics.
We derive optimal monetary policy rules under a set of different regimes. We find that
the central bank’s response to inflation decreases slightly if financial market stability enters
33Recall, that private agents have to form beliefs about sf . Compare eq. (3.25).
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the central bank’s objective function. Another interesting result is that the optimal central
bank reaction to deviations of inflation to their target becomes weaker, the higher the degree
of interaction between the financial and real sector.
Finally, we test if the standard results that monetary policy should be backward-looking
if the system is forward-looking (and vice versa), can be confirmed for our boundedly ra-
tional NKM. We have shown that because the backward-looking nature of the expectations
algorithm turns the forward-looking model into a backward-looking one, monetary policy
should optimally depend on contemporaneous variables. If, instead, the policy rule becomes
backward-looking, the economy is strongly destabilized. Additionally we analyze the impor-
tance of unconventional monetary policy instruments and find that they increase welfare only
marginally in comparison to conventional policy.
While a number of research questions have been answered in this paper, others had to
remain open. For example, we did only focus on simple rules when deriving optimal monetary
policy. A detailed treatment of optimal unrestricted policy rules in case of boundedly rational
expectations should be conducted in future research.
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3.8 Appendix
3.8.1 Microfoundation of IS Curve with SINU Approach
The household’s period utility is determined by (3.1)-(3.3) and reads
U(Cq, Dq, Nq) =
Z1−σq
1− σ
−
N1+ηq
1 + η
(3.38)
with: Zq =
[
α1C
1−ν
q + α2D
1−ν
q
] 1
1−ν (0 < α1, α2 < 1) (3.39)
s.t. Cq +
SqDq
Pq
+
Tnq
Pq
+
Bq
Pq
=
Wq
Pq
Nq +
(
d˜q−1 + Sq−1
) Dq−1
Pq
+ (1 + iq−1)
Bq−1
Pq
(3.40)
Cq = −
SqDq
Pq
−
Tnq
Pq
−
Bq
Pq
+
Wq
Pq
Nq +
(
d˜q−1 + Sq−1
) Dq−1
Pq
+ (1 + iq−1)
Bq−1
Pq︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Yq
(3.41)
The partial derivatives of U and Z are:
∂U
∂Zq
= Z−σq
∂Z
∂Cq
= α1Z
ν
qC
−ν
q
∂Z
∂Dq
= α2Z
ν
qD
−ν
q (3.42)
∂U
∂Cq
=
∂U
∂Zq
∂Zq
∂Cq
= α1Z
ν−σ
q C
−ν
q
∂U
∂Dq
=
∂U
∂Zq
∂Zq
∂Dq
= α2Z
ν−σ
q D
−ν
q (3.43)
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An infinitely lived household maximizes the expected infinite sum of a discounted utility
stream for q = 0, 1, ...∞. The Lagrangian of the given optimization problem reads:
ℓ = Eq
[
∞∑
k=0
βk {U (Cq+k, Dq+k, Nq+k) + λq+k(Yq+k − Cq+k)}
]
(3.44)
FOC 1:
∂ℓ
∂Cq
=
∂U
∂Cq
− λq
!
= 0 ⇔ λq =
∂U
∂Cq
= α1Z
ν−σ
q C
−ν
q (3.45)
FOC 2:
∂ℓ
∂Bq
= −λq
1
Pq
+ β(1 + iq) · Eq
[
λq+1
Pq+1
]
!
= 0 (3.46)
Plugging FOC 1 into FOC 2 yields the Euler equation
α1Z
ν−σ
q C
−ν
q
1
Pq
= βα1(1 + iq) · Eq
[
Zν−σq+1 C
−ν
q+1
Pq+1
]
(3.47)
β · Eq

(Zq+1
Zq
)ν−σ (
Cq+1
Cq
)
−ν (
Pq
Pq+1
) = 1
1 + iq
(3.48)
FOC 3:
∂ℓ
∂Dq
=
∂U
∂Dq
+ λq
∂Yq
∂Dq
+ β Eq
[
λq+1
∂Yq+1
∂Dq
]
!
= 0 (3.49)
⇔ α2Z
ν−σ
q D
−ν
q − α1Z
ν−σ
q C
−ν
q
Sq
Pq
+ βα1Eq
[
Zν−σq+1 C
−ν
q+1
Pq+1
] (
d˜q + Sq
)
= 0 (3.50)
⇔ α2Z
ν−σ
q D
−ν
q + βα1Eq
[
Zν−σq+1 C
−ν
q+1
Pq+1
] (
d˜q + Sq
)
= α1Z
ν−σ
q C
−ν
q
Sq
Pq
(3.51)
⇔
α2
α1
(
Dq
Cq
)
−ν
+ β Eq

(Zq+1
Zq
)ν−σ (
Cq+1
Cq
)
−ν
1
Pq+1

(d˜q + Sq) = Sq
Pq
(3.52)
⇔
α2
α1
(
Dq
Cq
)
−ν
Pq
Sq
+
d˜q + Sq
Sq
β Eq

(Zq+1
Zq
)ν−σ (
Cq+1
Cq
)
−ν
Pq
Pq+1


︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
1+iq
= 1 (3.53)
⇔
α2
α1
(
Dq
Cq
)
−ν
=
Sq
Pq
[
1−
d˜q + Sq
Sq
1
1 + iq
]
(3.54)
⇔
α2
α1
(
Dq
Cq
)
−ν
=
Sq
Pq
[
Sqiq − d˜q
Sq(1 + iq)
]
(3.55)
⇔
(
Dq
Cq
)
−ν
=
α1
α2
1
Pq
[
Sqiq − d˜q
1 + iq
]
(3.56)
In the most simple case, the stock price sq should relate to the discounted sum of future
dividends (compare Campbell et al. (1997) chapter 7 for this equation and more general
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versions):
sq =
∞∑
k=0
β˜k Eq
[
d˜q+k
]
(3.57)
For the sake of simplicity we do not model the expectation of future dividends Eq
[
d˜q+k
]
in
a way similar to the boundedly rational expectations (3.12)-(3.11) but simply assume static
expectations
Eq
[
d˜q+k
]
= d˜q ∀ k = 0, 1, ... (3.58)
which imply for (3.57)
sq = d˜q
1
1− β˜
(3.59)
Γsq = d˜q with: Γ = 1− β˜ (3.60)
For the size of Γ there are three cases worth mentioning. First, in the case of riskless dividend
streams and zero inflation (i.e. the central bank’s target i⋆ = 0 always fulfilled), β˜ should be
equal to the discount factor in the utility function (3.38) and Γ would be less than i because:
β˜ = β : (Γ =) 1− β <
1
β
− 1 (= i) ⇔
(3.61)
1− β <
1− β
β
⇔
(3.62)
(1− β)β < 1− β ⇔
(3.63)
β < 1 holds by assumption
(3.64)
This implies i − Γ > 0. Given the standard parameterization of β we have numerically
i− Γ ≈ 0.0001. Second, in the case of risky dividend payments agents will discount dividend
payments stronger than the save interest payments from bonds (still no inflation risk) and the
discount factor β˜ becomes smaller than β which implies i − Γ < 0. In the third case, where
inflation risk is taken into account, agents could discount payments from stocks less than from
bonds which yields i − Γ > 0. We focus on the last case because i − Γ < 0 would lead to a
negative radicand in expression (3.103) and (3.104) and therefore to output levels xq being
complex numbers.
3. OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY IN A NKM WITH AS AND FM 37
We substitute d˜q in FOC 3 by Γs
f
q (where Γ depends on the strength of discounting of
bond yields compared to stock yields) to arrive at:
(
Dq
Cq
)
−ν
=
α1
α2
1
Pq
[
Sq(iq − Γ)
1 + iq
]
(3.65)
=
α1
α2
Sq
Pq
iq − Γ
1 + iq
(3.66)
Taking logs (small letters denote log values):
−ν[logDq − logCq] = log
{
α1
α2
}
+ logSq − logPq + log
{
iq − Γ
1 + iq
}
(3.67)
−νdq + νcq = log
{
α1
α2
}
+ sq − pq + log
{
iq − Γ
1 + iq
}
(3.68)
dq = cq −
1
ν
log
{
α1
α2
}
−
1
ν
(sq − pq)−
1
ν
log
{
iq − Γ
1 + iq
}
(3.69)
Note that the expression above is only defined for iq > Γ.
34 Let
f(iq) :=
1
ν
log
{
iq − Γ
1 + iq
}
(iq > Γ) . (3.70)
Then the first order Taylor approximation around the steady state i without the constant
term f( i ) is given by
f(iq) ≈ f
′( i ) · (iq − i) (3.71)
≈
1
ν
1 + i
i− Γ
1 + i− (i− Γ)
(1 + i)2
· (iq − i) (3.72)
≈
1
ν
1 + Γ
(i− Γ)(1 + i)
· (iq − i) (3.73)
Thus a linearization of (3.69) around the steady state yields the log-linear stock demand
function
dq ≈ cq −
1
ν
(sq − pq)−
1
ν
1 + Γ
(i− Γ)(1 + i)
· (iq − i) (3.74)
34If percentage deviations from steady state are used for linearization (instead of a log-linearization approach)
iq < Γ would also be allowed. This linearization, however, would be mathematically more involved.
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which was reported in eq. (3.4) in section 3.2. Next, the Euler equation has to be linearized
(where we follow Gali (2008)). After rearranging (3.47) a bit
βEq

(Zq+1
Zq
)ν−σ (
Cq+1
Cq
)σ−ν (
Cq
Cq+1
)σ (
Pq
Pq+1
) = 1
1 + iq
(3.75)
β(1 + iq)Eq

(Zq+1
Zq
)ν−σ (
Cq
Cq+1
)ν−σ (
Cq
Cq+1
)σ (
Pq
Pq+1
) = 1 (3.76)
β(1 + iq)Eq

(Zq+1
Cq+1
)ν−σ (
Cq
Zq
)ν−σ = Eq


(
Cq+1
Cq
)σ (
Pq+1
Pq
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
1+πq+1


(3.77)
we take logs
log β︸ ︷︷ ︸
−r
+ log(1 + iq)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≈iq
+(ν − σ)Eq [xq+1 − cq+1] + (ν − σ)(cq − xq) (3.78)
= σ · Eq [cq+1 − cq] + log Eq [1 + πq+1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≈Eq [πq+1]
and solve for cq to arrive at:
σcq = σEq [cq+1]− (iq − Eq [πq+1]− r) + (ν − σ) {Eq [cq+1 − xq+1]− (cq − xq)} (3.79)
cq = Eq [cq+1]−
1
σ
(iq − Eq [πq+1]− r) +
ν − σ
σ
{Eq [∆(cq+1 − xq+1)]} (3.80)
The expressions Eq [cq+1 − xq+1] and (cq − xq) can be replaced if we, first, linearize the com-
posite index (3.39) around the steady state
dZq = α1Z
ν
C
−ν
dCq + α2Z
ν
D
−ν
dDq (3.81)
dZq
Z
= α1Z
ν
C
−ν 1
Z
C
C
dCq + α2Z
ν 1
Z
C
C
D
−ν
dDq (3.82)
zq = α1
(
C
Z
)1−ν
cq + α2
(
D
Z
)1−ν
dq (3.83)
where zq =
dZq
Z
, cq =
dCq
C
, dq =
dDq
D
denote percentage deviations from steady state and dZq,
dCq, dDq absolute deviations. The steady state of (3.39) is given by:
Z
1−ν
= α1C
1−ν
+ α2D
1−ν
(3.84)
1− α1
C
1−ν
Z
1−ν = α2
D
1−ν
Z
1−ν (3.85)
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By subtracting (3.83) from cq
cq − zq =

1− α1
(
C
Z
)1−ν cq − α2
(
D
Z
)1−ν
dq (3.86)
plugging (3.85) into (3.86)
cq − zq = α2
(
D
Z
)1−ν
cq − α2
(
D
Z
)1−ν
dq (3.87)
= α2
(
D
Z
)1−ν
(cq − dq) (3.88)
and plugging (3.74) into (3.88) we arrive at
cq − zq =
α2
ν
(
D
Z
)1−ν {
(sq − pq) +
1 + Γ
(i− Γ)(1 + i)
· (iq − i)
}
(3.89)
which implies for the expected change of cq − zq:
Eq [∆(cq+1 − zq+1)] = Eq [cq+1 − zq+1]− (cq − zq) (3.90)
=
α2
ν
(
D
Z
)1−ν {
Eq [∆(sq+1 − pq+1)] +
1 + Γ
(i− Γ)(1 + i)
· Eq [∆iq+1]
}
(3.91)
Equation (3.80) then becomes
cq = Eq [cq+1]−
1
σ
(iq − Eq [πq+1]− r) +
ν − σ
σ
α2
ν
(
D
Z
)1−ν
· (3.92)
{
Eq [∆(sq+1 − pq+1)] +
1 + Γ
(i− Γ)(1 + i)
· Eq [∆iq+1]
}
or, if simplified further
cq = Eq [cq+1]−
1
σ
(iq − Eq [πq+1]− r) + c1 · Eq [∆(sq+1 − pq+1)] + c2 · Eq [∆iq+1] (3.93)
with c1 =
ν−σ
σ
α2
ν
(
D
Z
)1−ν
and c2 = c1 ·
1+Γ
(i−Γ)(1+i)
. We can identify
(
D
Z
)1−ν
by first rewriting
(3.84) to
Z
1−ν
D
1−ν = α1
C
1−ν
D
1−ν + α2 (3.94)
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and then rewriting (3.66) to get:
(
D
C
)1−ν
=
(
α1
α2
S
P
i− Γ
1 + i
) 1−ν
−ν
(3.95)
(
C
D
)1−ν
=
(
α1
α2
S
P
i− Γ
1 + i
) 1−ν
ν
(3.96)
Plugging (3.96) into (3.94) we get
Z
1−ν
D
1−ν = α1
(
α1
α2
S
P
i− Γ
1 + i
) 1−ν
ν
+ α2 (3.97)
(
D
Z
)1−ν
=
1
α1
(
α1
α2
S
P
i−Γ
1+i
) 1−ν
ν + α2
α1
α1
(3.98)
(
D
Z
)1−ν
=
1
α1
[(
α1
α2
) 1−ν
ν
(
S
P
i−Γ
1+i
) 1−ν
ν + α2
α1
] (3.99)
(
D
Z
)1−ν
=
1
α1
α2
α1
[(
α2
α1
)
−
1
ν
(
S
P
i−Γ
1+i
) 1−ν
ν + 1
] (3.100)
and the constants c1 and c2 become:
c1 =
ν − σ
σ
α2
ν
1
α1
α2
α1
[(
α2
α1
)
−
1
ν
(
S
P
i−Γ
1+i
) 1−ν
ν + 1
] (3.101)
=
ν − σ
σν
1(
α2
α1
)
−
1
ν
(
S
P
i−Γ
1+i
) 1−ν
ν + 1
(3.102)
=
ν − σ
σν
(
S
P
i−Γ
1+i
) ν−1
ν
(
α1
α2
) 1
ν +
(
S
P
i−Γ
1+i
) ν−1
ν
(3.103)
c2 =
ν − σ
σν
(
S
P
i−Γ
1+i
) ν−1
ν
(
α1
α2
) 1
ν +
(
S
P
i−Γ
1+i
) ν−1
ν
1 + Γ
(i− Γ)(1 + i)
(3.104)
To be in line with the notation of (3.7)-(3.6) we drop r in eq. (3.93) so that the nominal
interest rate iq is now interpreted as the difference to steady sate:
cq = Eq [cq+1]−
1
σ
(iq − Eq [πq+1]) + c1 · Eq [∆sq+1 − πq+1] + c2 · Eq [∆iq+1] (3.105)
In equilibrium, consumption equals production so that cq is replaced by output xq. Finally, a
noise term ǫx is added and expectations are assumed to be given by the boundedly rational
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heuristic E˜q [ · ]:
xq = Eq [xq+1]−
1
σ
(iq − Eq [πq+1]) + c1 · Eq [∆sq+1 − πq+1] + c2 · Eq [∆iq+1] + ǫ
x
q (3.106)
With stock demand of period q given as
dq = xq − c3(sq − pq)− c4iq with: c3 =
1
ν
, c4 =
1
ν
1 + Γ
(i− Γ)(1 + i)
(3.107)
3.8.2 Derive Solution of NKM
The three model equations read
iq = δπ
(
E˜q [πq+1]− π
⋆
q
)
+ δxE˜q [xq+1] + ǫ
i
q (3.108)
xq = E˜q [xq+1]−
1
σ
(
iq − E˜q [πq+1]
)
+ c1 · E˜q [∆sq+1 − πq+1] + c2 · E˜q [∆iq+1] + ǫ
x
q (3.109)
πq = βE˜q [πq+1] + γxq − κsq + ǫ
π
q (3.110)
where the target inflation level π⋆ is again set to zero and market expectations are given by
E˜q [xq+1] = ω
tar
x,qx + ω
hab
x,q xq−1 + ω
ext
x,q (xq + αx · [xq − xq−1]) (3.111)
= ωextx,q (1 + αx)xq + (ω
hab
x,q − αxω
ext
x,q )xq−1 (3.112)
E˜q [πq+1] = ω
tar
π,qπ
⋆ + ωrofπ,qπq−1 + ω
ext
π,q (πq + απ · [πq − πq−1]) (3.113)
= ωextπ,q(1 + απ)πq + (ω
rof
π,q − απω
ext
π,q)πq−1 (3.114)
E˜q [sq+1] = ω
tar
s,qhxq + ω
sta
s,q sq−1 + ω
ext
s,q (sq + αs [sq − sq−1]) (3.115)
= ωexts,q (1 + αs) sq +
(
ωstas,q − αsω
ext
s,q
)
sq−1 + ω
tar
s,qhxq (3.116)
E˜q [iq+1] = iq (3.117)
where –following Lengnick and Wohltmann (2013) and Westerhoff (2012)– the perceived fun-
damental value is set to sfq = h · xq. Plugging (3.108) into (3.109) we get:
xq = E˜q [xq+1]−
1
σ
(
δπE˜q [πq+1] + δxE˜q [xq+1] + ǫ
i
q − E˜q [πq+1]
)
+ c1 · E˜q [∆sq+1 − πq+1] + ǫ
x
q (3.118)
xq =
σ − δx
σ
E˜q [xq+1] +
1− δπ − σc1
σ
E˜q [πq+1] + c1 E˜q [sq+1]− c1 sq + ǫ
x
q −
1
σ
ǫiq (3.119)
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Plugging expectations into (3.119) and (3.110) gives
xq =
σ − δx
σ
(
ωextx,q (1 + αx)xq + (ω
hab
x,q − αxω
ext
x,q )xq−1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
E˜q [xq+1]
+
1− δπ − σc1
σ
(
ωextπ,q(1 + απ)πq + (ω
rof
π,q − απω
ext
π,q)πq−1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
E˜q [πq+1]
+ c1
(
ωexts,q (1 + αs) sq +
(
ωstas,q − αsω
ext
s,q
)
sq−1 + ω
tar
s,qhxq
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
E˜q [sq+1]
−c1 sq + ǫ
x
q −
1
σ
ǫiq (3.120)
πq = β
(
ωextπ,q(1 + απ)πq + (ω
rof
π,q − απω
ext
π,q)πq−1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
E˜q [πq+1]
+γxq − κsq + ǫ
π
q (3.121)
After some rearranging
(
σ − (σ − δx)ω
ext
x,q (1 + αx)− σc1ω
tar
s,qh
)
xq − (1− δπ − σc1)ω
ext
π,q(1 + απ)πq
= (σ − δx)(ω
hab
x,q − αxω
ext
x,q )xq−1 + (1− δπ − σc1)(ω
rof
π,q − απω
ext
π,q)πq−1
+ c1σ
(
ωexts,q (1 + αs)− 1
)
sq + c1σ
(
ωstas,q − αsω
ext
s,q
)
sq−1 + σǫ
x
q − ǫ
i
q (3.122)
−γxq +
(
1− βωextπ,q(1 + απ)
)
πq = β
(
ωrofπ,q − απω
ext
π,q
)
πq−1 − κsq + ǫ
π
q (3.123)
we arrive at the matrix form
Aq
(
xq
πq
)
= Cq
(
xq−1
πq−1
)
+Dq · sq +Eq · sq−1 +
(
σǫxq − ǫ
i
q
ǫπq
)
(3.124)
with the time dependent system matrices:
Aq =
(
σ − (σ − δx)ω
ext
x,q (1 + αx)− σc1ω
tar
s,qh −(1− δπ − σc1)ω
ext
π,q(1 + απ)
−γ 1− βωextπ,q(1 + απ)
)
Cq =

 (σ − δx)(ωhabx,q − αxωextx,q ) (1− δπ − σc1)(ωrofπ,q − απωextπ,q)
0 β
(
ωrofπ,q − απω
ext
π,q
)


Dq =

 c1σ
(
ωexts,q (1 + αs)− 1
)
−κ

 Eq =

 c1σ
(
ωstas,q − αsω
ext
s,q
)
0


Multiplying with A−1q we arrive at the solution:
(
xq
πq
)
= A−1q Cq
(
xq−1
πq−1
)
+A−1q Dq · sq +A
−1
q Eq · sq−1 +A
−1
q
(
σǫxq − ǫ
i
q
ǫπq
)
(3.125)
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3.8.3 Derive Solution of NKM (Version 2)
In this version, the Taylor rule depends on contemporaneous values. The three model equa-
tions are given by:
iq = δπ
(
πq − π
⋆
q
)
+ δxxq + ǫ
i
q (3.126)
xq = E˜q [xq+1]−
1
σ
(
iq − E˜q [πq+1]
)
+ c1 · E˜q [∆sq+1 − πq+1] + c2 · E˜q [∆iq+1] + ǫ
x
q (3.127)
πq = βE˜q [πq+1] + γxq − κsq + ǫ
π
q (3.128)
Plugging (3.126) into (3.127) we get:
xq = E˜q [xq+1]−
1
σ
({
δππq + δxxq + ǫ
i
q
}
− E˜q [πq+1]
)
+ c1 · E˜q [∆sq+1 − πq+1] + ǫ
x
q
(3.129)
xq = E˜q [xq+1] +
1
σ
E˜q [πq+1]−
δπ
σ
πq −
δx
σ
xq + c1 · E˜q [∆sq+1 − πq+1] + ǫ
x
q −
1
σ
ǫiq (3.130)
Plugging in expectations:
xq = ω
ext
x,q (1 + αx)xq + (ω
hab
x,q − αxω
ext
x,q )xq−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
E˜q [xq+1]
+
1− σc1
σ
(
ωextπ,q(1 + απ)πq + (ω
rof
π,q − απω
ext
π,q)πq−1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
E˜q [πq+1]
−
δπ
σ
πq −
δx
σ
xq + c1 ·
(
ωexts,q (1 + αs) sq +
(
ωstas,q − αsω
ext
s,q
)
sq−1 + ω
tar
s,qhxq
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
E˜q [sq+1]
−c1sq + ǫ
x
q −
1
σ
ǫiq
(3.131)
πq = β
(
ωextπ,q(1 + απ)πq + (ω
rof
π,q − απω
ext
π,q)πq−1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
E˜q [πq+1]
+γxq − κsq + ǫ
π
q (3.132)
After some rearranging
(
σ − σωextx,q (1 + αx) + δx − c1σω
tar
s,qh
)
xq −
[
(1− σc1)ω
ext
π,q(1 + απ) + δπ
]
πq
= σ(ωhabx,q − αxω
ext
x,q )xq−1 + (1− σc1)(ω
rof
π,q − απω
ext
π,q)πq−1
+ c1σ
(
ωexts,q (1 + αs) sq +
(
ωstas,q − αsω
ext
s,q
)
sq−1
)
− c1σsq + σǫ
x
q − ǫ
i
q (3.133)
−γxq +
(
1− βωextπ,q(1 + απ)
)
πq = β
(
ωrofπ,q − απω
ext
π,q
)
πq−1 − κsq + ǫ
π
q (3.134)
we arrive at the matrix form
Aq
(
xq
πq
)
= Cq
(
xq−1
πq−1
)
+Dq · sq +Eq · sq−1 +
(
σǫxq − ǫ
i
q
ǫπq
)
(3.135)
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with the time dependent system matrices:
Aq =
(
σ − σωextx,q (1 + αx) + δx − σc1ω
tar
s,qh −(1− σc1)ω
ext
π,q(1 + απ)− δπ
−γ 1− βωextπ,q(1 + απ)
)
Cq =

 σ(ωhabx,q − αxωextx,q ) (1− σc1)(ωrofπ,q − απωextπ,q)
0 β
(
ωrofπ,q − απω
ext
π,q
)


Dq =

 c1σ
(
ωexts,q (1 + αs)− 1
)
−κ

 Eq =

 c1σ
(
ωstas,q − αsω
ext
s,q
)
0


Multiplying with A−1q we arrive at the solution:
(
xq
πq
)
= A−1q Cq
(
xq−1
πq−1
)
+A−1q Dq · sq +A
−1
q Eq · sq−1 +A
−1
q
(
σǫxq − ǫ
i
q
ǫπq
)
(3.136)
3.8.4 Derive Solution of NKM (Version 3)
In this version, the Taylor rule depends on past values. The three model equations are given
by:
iq = δπ
(
πq−1 − π
⋆
q
)
+ δxxq−1 + ǫ
i
q (3.137)
xq = E˜q [xq+1]−
1
σ
(
iq − E˜q [πq+1]
)
+ c1 · E˜q [∆sq+1 − πq+1] + c2 · E˜q [∆iq+1] + ǫ
x
q (3.138)
πq = βE˜q [πq+1] + γxq − κsq + ǫ
π
q (3.139)
Plugging (3.137) into (3.138) we get:
xq = E˜q [xq+1]−
1
σ
({
δππq−1 + δxxq−1 + ǫ
i
q
}
− E˜q [πq+1]
)
+ c1 · E˜q [∆sq+1 − πq+1] + ǫ
x
q
(3.140)
xq = E˜q [xq+1] +
1
σ
E˜q [πq+1]−
δπ
σ
πq−1 −
δx
σ
xq−1 + c1 · E˜q [∆sq+1 − πq+1] + ǫ
x
q −
1
σ
ǫiq (3.141)
Plugging in expectations:
xq = ω
ext
x,q (1 + αx)xq + (ω
hab
x,q − αxω
ext
x,q )xq−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
E˜q [xq+1]
+
1− σc1
σ
{
ωextπ,q(1 + απ)πq + (ω
rof
π,q − απω
ext
π,q)πq−1
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
E˜q [πq+1]
−
δπ
σ
πq−1 −
δx
σ
xq−1 + c1
{
ωexts,q (1 + αs) sq +
(
ωstas,q − αsω
ext
s,q
)
sq−1 + ω
tar
s,qhxq
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
E˜q [sq+1]
− c1 · sq + ǫ
x
q −
1
σ
ǫiq (3.142)
πq = β
(
ωextπ,q(1 + απ)πq + (ω
rof
π,q − απω
ext
π,q)πq−1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
E˜q [πq+1]
+γxq − κsq + ǫ
π
q (3.143)
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After some rearranging
σ
(
1− ωextx,q (1 + αx)− c1ω
tar
s,qh
)
xq − (1− σc1)ω
ext
π,q(1 + απ)πq
= (σωhabx,q − σαxω
ext
x,q − δx)xq−1 +
{
(1− σc1)(ω
rof
π,q − απω
ext
π,q)− δπ
}
πq−1
+ σc1
{
ωexts,q (1 + αs)− 1
}
sq + σc1
(
ωstas,q − αsω
ext
s,q
)
sq−1 + σǫ
x
q − ǫ
i
q (3.144)
−γxq +
(
1− βωextπ,q(1 + απ)
)
πq = β
(
ωrofπ,q − απω
ext
π,q
)
πq−1 − κsq + ǫ
π
q (3.145)
we arrive at the matrix form
Aq
(
xq
πq
)
= Cq
(
xq−1
πq−1
)
+Dq · sq +Eq · sq−1 +
(
σǫxq − ǫ
i
q
ǫπq
)
(3.146)
with the time dependent system matrices:
Aq =
(
σ − σωextx,q (1 + αx)− σc1ω
tar
s,qh −(1− σc1)ω
ext
π,q(1 + απ)
−γ 1− βωextπ,q(1 + απ)
)
Cq =

 σ(ωhabx,q − αxωextx,q )− δx (1− σc1)(ωrofπ,q − απωextπ,q)− δπ
0 β
(
ωrofπ,q − απω
ext
π,q
)


Dq =

 c1σ
(
ωexts,q (1 + αs)− 1
)
−κ

 Eq =

 c1σ
(
ωstas,q − αsω
ext
s,q
)
0


Multiplying with A−1q we arrive at the solution:
(
xq
πq
)
= A−1q Cq
(
xq−1
πq−1
)
+A−1q Dq · sq +A
−1
q Eq · sq−1 +A
−1
q
(
σǫxq − ǫ
i
q
ǫπq
)
(3.147)
3.8.5 Further Comparison with the Original De Grauwe Model
In this section we compare the properties of our real sector submodel (appendix 3.8.2; no
extension) to those of the original DeGrauwe model (which was also used in Lengnick and
Wohltmann (2013)).
Expectations Heuristics
In both, the real and financial subsystem, agents make use of boundedly rational heuristics
to form expectations. Unfortunately, those heuristics assumed in De Grauwe (2010a,b,c) and
Westerhoff (2008) are of a different character. E.g.: Westerhoff assumes an extrapolation
of the recently observed stock price (st) movement
35 while DeGrauwe simply takes the past
35Westerhoff (2008) does only implicitly use expectations formation. Compare Lengnick and Wohltmann
(2013), section 2.1.
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value as the extrapolators’ rule:
Westerhoff: E˜ [st+1] = st + k · (st − st−1) (3.148)
DeGrauwe: E˜ [πq+1] = πq−1 (3.149)
For consistency, and because E˜ [xt+1] = xt−1 is typically called static expectations (instead of
extrapolative), we apply
E˜
ext
q [πq+1] = πq + απ · [πq − πq−1] (3.150)
as the extrapolators’ heuristic in the real sector. At the same time we keep the static expec-
tations of DeGrauwe
E˜
sta
q [πq+1] = πq−1 (3.151)
because they give rise to hybridity (similar to the rule-of-thumb or habit formation arguments).
The targeters’ rule corresponds to that of fundamentalists in the financial sector:
E˜
tar
q [πq+1] = π
⋆
q (3.152)
Just as fundamentalists believe that stock prices are going to return to the steady state,
targeters believe that inflation is going to return to its steady state.
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Figure 3.8: Outut gap and its expectations in DeGrauwe NKM
Besides consistency issues, these assumptions also solve a problem that can occur in the
original De Grauwe expectations. In his model agents’ expectations are either given by a
positive (optimists) or a negative value (pessimists).
Optimists: E˜
opt
q [xq+1] = gq with: 2gq = µ+ ν · std[xq] (3.153)
Pessimists: E˜
opt
q [xq+1] = −gq
(
= − E˜
opt
q [xq+1]
)
(3.154)
Figure 3.8 illustrates the development of output (solid line) and the corresponding expecta-
tions of optimists and pessimists (dashed lines). For the parameterization consult table 3.6.
Output fluctuates in a range between -0.6 and 0.6 while expectations are almost constant at
-0.5 and 0.5. Sometimes (e.g. point A) we find the somewhat strange result that optimists
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expect falling output, a behavior that can hardly be called optimistic any more. Additionally,
the pessimists would expect a fall of output from 0.6 down to -0.5. Such a huge change is
never observed through the entire series and thus seems a bit too unreasonable to expect.
Similar issues can also arise for pessimists (point B). This problem disappears when heuristics
(3.9)-(3.14) are applied.
Bifurcation Analysis
The De Grauwe model does also give rise to bifurcations and stable limit cycles. Bifurcation
diagrams of the deterministic core for π and x with respect to the learning algorithm param-
eters µ, φ and ζ are shown in figure 3.9. The corresponding parameterization is given in table
3.6. Small levels of belief bias µ ∈ (0; 0.575) guarantee a unique steady state. At µ = 0.575 a
pitchfork bifurcation takes place and above 1.425 stable limit cycles emerge. Note, however,
that these results exploit the problematic expectations heuristic described above.
Table 3.6: Parameterization of original DeGrauwe model
NKM Hybridity Policy Learning Noise
σ = 1.0 χ = 0.80 δx = 0.5 ζ = 0.5 σǫ = 0.15
β = 0.99 ψ = 0.80 δπ = 1.5 φ = 10
γ = 0.33 µ = 0.5
ν = 2
The parameter φ does not give rise to similar phenomenon while the memory parameter
ζ gives rise to a bifurcation at ζ = 0.63. If agents’ memory is very high (ζ ∈ [0.967, 0.983]),
the system displays stable limit cycles on the intervals x ∈ (−0.062, 0.062), π ∈ (−0.15, 0.15).
For ζ ∈ [0.983, 1[ the system either converges against a positive or a negative steady state,
for perfect memory ζ = 1 the model explodes.
In contrast, our adjusted NKM displayes bifurcation and stable limit cycles for the pa-
rameters αx and απ (figure 3.10). Like the original De Grauwe model the intensity of choice
parameter φ does not give rise to any bifurcations. In contrast to De Grauwe our version
does also not give rise to bifurcations or limit cycles for high values of the memory parameter.
Even for perfect memory ζ = 1 our model is solvable.
Table 3.7: Parameterization of our model
NKM Hybridity Policy Learning Noise
σ = 1.0 - δx = 0.5 ζ = 0.5 σǫ = 0.15
β = 0.99 δπ = 1.5 φ = 10
γ = 0.33 αx = απ = 0.2
The Special Case of Full Price Flexibility
In NKMs, price stickiness is given by the Calvo parameter θ. Perfect price flexibility is
archived if (1− θ) → 1 while for θ → 1 prices are fully rigid. The Calvo parameter is one of
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Figure 3.9: Bifurcation plots of original De Grauwe (2010) NKM
the deep parameters that affect γ in the Phillips curve:
γ =
(1− θ)(1− βθ)
θ
1− α
1− α+ αǫ
(
σ +
ϕ+ α
1− α
)
(3.155)
In the following we set α = 0 (constant returns to scale production function), ǫ = 6 (induces
a markup of 20%), ϕ = 1.0 (a unitary Frisch elasticity of labor supply), σ = 1.0 (log utility).
Compare Gali (2008) on the microfoundation of γ and our parameterization. To test the effect
of price flexibility on our model, we vary 1− θ on the interval from 0 to 1. The calibration of
all other is given in table 3.6 for the original DeGrauwe model and in table 3.7 for our model.
To illustrate the impact of changing price flexibility on the system, we plot the (deter-
ministic) steady state of inflation and output for different values of (1− θ) in figure 3.11. In
the original DeGrauwe model (panel (a)), stability of the steady state is only guaranteed for
values of (1− θ) up to 0.74. If price flexibility is increased above that value, the model yields
explosive dynamics. This problem does not occur in our model (panel (b)). Even for full price
flexibility, the model has convergent (i.e. stable) solutions.
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Figure 3.10: Bifurcation plots of adjusted NKM
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Figure 3.11: Steady state of deterministic core for different degrees of price flexibility
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sector and find that an interbank market stabilizes the economy during normal times but
amplifies systemic instability, contagion and bankruptcy cascades during crises. But even
with no interbank market, indirect contagion can lead to bankruptcy cascades. We also find
that the existence of large banks threatens stability and that regulatory policy should target
large banks more strictly than small.
Keywords: Financial instability, agent-based macroeconomics, stock-flow consistency, disequi-
librium analysis, Basel III
JEL classification: C63, E42, E51, G01
52
5. MONEY CREATION AND FINANCIAL INSTABILITY 53
5.1 Introduction
The recent crisis has vividly demonstrated that the stability of the banking sector is highly
important for the stability of the economy as a whole. A collapse of single banks can have
severe and long lasting negative effects on other banks and on the real economy. To shed light
on the instability of the banking sector, we develop an agent-based computational economic
(ACE) model that covers the monetary side of transactions among households, firms and
banks. We are able to show that systemic risk is inevitably interwoven with the creation of
money in the credit market and, thus, an intrinsic property of modern economies.
The creation of systemic risk in the banking sector has been subject to numerous research
projects in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Battiston et al. (2012) have developed an
ACE model of a dynamic credit network. The authors have built on a system of stochastic
differential equations and show the existence of a destabilizing financial accelerator. In another
related research project Tedeschi et al. (2011) have developed a three sector ACE model that
includes the credit sector but also a real sector. The authors have found that credit connections
between banks have no impact on GDP but create systemic risk. In line with these findings
Lenzu and Tedeschi (2011) have analyzed an interbanking network and have found that the
network structure plays an important role for the stability of the system. In a very recent
paper, Krause and Giansante (2012) have developed a network based interbanking model
and analyzed its stability by letting one bank fail exogenously. They also found that the
network structure plays an important role in producing systemic risk and that the probability
of observing a cascade is positively correlated with the size of the initially shocked bank.
What is novel in our approach is that individual interactions give endogenously rise to an
interconnected banking sector which creates systemic risk and bankruptcy cascades. We show
that maturity mismatches (Bank of England 2011, Milne 2013) between different assets and
liabilities are a driving force that, first, build up systemic risk and, second, trigger financial
crises endogenously. An exogenous depreciation of assets (e.g. burst of bubble) is not needed
to trigger a crisis.
In the literature on stock-flow consistent (SFC) modeling it has been argued that the key
to understand the recent economic crisis is debt growth. In line with the invocations of Arnold
(2009), Bezemer (2010, 2012b) and Caverzasi and Godin (2013) for an accounting of economics
we implement SFC as the accounting part to our model of the credit sector to investigate the
potential contribution of SFC to ACE macroeconomics. Formally, we follow the definition of
Patterson and Stephenson (1988) whereupon each flow induces a change of stocks of equal
size.1 In an ACE model SFC simply assures that transactions are consistently accounted for in
a double-entry bookkeeping system. A difference to “standard” SFC (Lavoie and Zezza 2012)
models is that we compute the balance sheet for every single agent (microscopic level) instead
of only consolidated balance sheets for every type of agents (aggregate level). Therefore, we
can dispense with the usual (consolidated) matrix notation.
1Consult the definition in Patterson and Stephenson (1988), p. 189. Another, related definition can be
found in Taylor (2008).
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 gives a short overview over the current state
of ACE macroeconomics. The model is defined in Section 5.3. A simulation that illustrates
the endogenous creation of money is performed in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 introduces an
interbank market. Simulations of this extended model are presented in Section 5.6. Section
5.7 introduces an active central bank that offers standing facilities and analyzes the impact
of regulatory policy. Section 5.8 concludes.
5.2 The ACE Method
A method that seems well suited for the analysis of endogenous crises is ACE modeling.2
ACE models can be understood as the simulation of artificial worlds that are populated
by autonomous interacting agents. Every agent is equipped with properties describing his
internal state and with behavioral rules that guide its interaction with others. Once created,
the artificial economy is left alone and agents interact according to the defined rules. Instead
of solving a system of equations, the model is simply run. Aggregate statistics like the price
index or GDP can then easily be calculated from the resulting individual dynamics.
One strength of the ACE method is that no assumptions about the macro level are nec-
essary. The passage from micro to macro is created by interaction and not by assuming a
representative individual or by summing up heterogeneous individual decisions and equili-
brating aggregate supply and demand on the market for labor, goods, money and so on. All
observed regularities of the aggregate variables are, therefore, endogenously emerging from
micro assumptions and micro interactions. With our ACE model we can, thus, analyze the
banking sector as a large decentralized economic system. We are able to answer how agents,
which are not endowed with unrealistically high information processing capacities (Ackerman
(2002), Gaffeo et al. (2008), Fair (2009), Kirman (2010)), can coordinate so well through the
market mechanism without any central clearing device or auctioneer and, more importantly,
why this coordination brakes down from time to time.
The major weakness of ACE models is that the modeler is left with enormous degrees
of freedom in choosing the types of agents, their behavioral rules and the structure of mar-
kets. Consequently, the few ACE macro models that exist are very different in nature, since
they start with very different assumptions and employ very different ways of modeling. Ad-
ditionally, it is easy to deal with enormous complexity. ACE modelers are, thus, tempted
to over-increase the level of complexity in their models (i.g. add too much types of agents,
behavioral rules, special cases for a certain interaction, ... ). As a result, the available ACE
macro models are often so complex that it is unclear which macro pattern is a result of what
micro property. Models appear as black boxes where the passage from input to output is not
fully clear.3
2Axtell (2007), Colander et al. (2008), Keen (2009), Kirman (2010), Delli Gatti et al. (2010).
3Fagiolo and Roventini (2012) put it as follows: “The more one tries to inject into the model ’realist’
assumptions, the more the system becomes complicate to study and the less clear the causal relations going
from assumptions to implications are.” The authors call this problem over-parameterization. They offer a
detailed discussion of the pros and cons of ACE and some possible guides to assumption selection that prohibit
5. MONEY CREATION AND FINANCIAL INSTABILITY 55
In the present paper we address this criticism by keeping the model as simple as possible.
The number of different types of agents and different behavioral rules are kept as small as
possible. Following Gode and Sunder (2004), Ussher (2008) and Chen (2012) we assume
that our agents are of the zero intelligence type (ZIA). This assumption allows to create a
benchmark which isolates the effect of market rules on market outcomes independent of the
influence of agent’s strategic response to new information.
5.3 The Model
In this section we present a formal description of our model. Although the following presenta-
tion is already very detailed, we have to leave out some minor important aspects that are only
intended to make the graphical animation more convenient. The full source code is available
upon request. The model description follows the ODD (Overview, Design concepts, Details)
protocol.4
5.3.1 Overview
Purpose
Our aim is to build a very simple model that concentrates on the monetary side of transactions.
Although simple, our model creates a complex interrelated network of financial claims. This
network of claims necessarily produces inherent instability and the threat of deep crises. Since
our model has a natural equilibrium benchmark in standard theory, it is well suited to contrast
SFC/ACE models with the mainstream approach.
Entities, State Variables and Scales
The artificial environment is populated by three different types of agents: banks (BA), house-
holds (HH) and a central bank (CB). HHs in our setting are interpreted as representatives of
the complete real sector and, therefore, also have characteristics that are typically ascribed to
firms:5 they buy goods but also produce them, they save but also take loans. We index BAs
by the subscript b = 1, ..., B and HHs by h = 1, ..., H where we set B ≪ H. BAs and HHs
are characterized by their positioning on a two dimensional landscape. Space plays a minor
role in the model. It is used as a tool to provide random matching and to introduce frictions.
The CB is introduced to close the system from an accounting point of view. For simplicity,
we start with assuming that there are no repo operations or standing facilities.
over-parameterization.
A similar point is made by Farmer et al. (2012) who argue that the fundamental question for ACE economics
is how aggregate macro behavior emerges from heterogeneous interacting individuals at the micro level. This
question can be addressed with stylized ACE models.
Consult also Caverzasi and Godin (2013) who highlight on the didactical use of simple SFC models.
4The ODD protocol has been developed to standardize the presentation of ACE models. The full description
can be found in Grimm et al. (2010).
5Such yeoman farmer assumptions are not unusual as a theoretical approximation, e.g. compare the NOEM
approach of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996).
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As a result, the CBs’ assets are fixed throughout the entire simulation. We denote this
exogenously given value by Acb which can be set to any positive value without changing
the simulation results and might be interpreted as gold reserves. These assumptions will be
relaxed in Section 5.7.
The most important state variable that characterizes BAs and HHs is cash (C). It is the
only medium of exchange, i.e. all transactions have to be payed with cash. We explicitly
model every single agent’s balance sheet at every point in time.6 In this balance sheet C is
recorded on the assets’ side. Each agent can also possess claims on the cash of other agents.
We denote claims of HHs against BAs with D (for deposits) and claims of BAs against HHs
with L (for loans). Obviously, D is recorded as an asset in the HHs balance sheet and as
liability in that of BAs, vice versa for L. The balance sheet structure is exemplified in Sheets
1 - 3.
Sheet 1: Example HH h
Assets Liabilities
Cash Loan Bank
Ch Lh
Deposits
Dh
Equity
Eh
Sheet 2: Example BA b
Assets Liabilities
Cash HH Deposits
Cb Db
Reserve
Rb
Credits
Lb Equity
Eb
Sheet 3: Central Bank (CB)
Assets Liabilities
Gold Currency
Acb Ccb
BA Deposits
Rcb
Equity
Ecb
Each BA is required to deposit required reserves at the CB (denoted by R). Required
reserves Rb are a claim of b against the CB. We assume that a BA can, immediately and
at any height, convert R into C and vice versa. This assumption accounts for the fact that
transactions between private banks and the central bank are carried out much faster and for
smaller time horizons (e.g. overnight) than transactions with the real sector. The liquidity
reserves of BAs are, therefore, given by F b = Cb + Rb while those of HHs are given by Ch.
We denote the corresponding CB positions Ccb +Rcb the monetary base (MB).
For simplicity, we assume that every HH can only have claims against one given BA (this
BA is denoted bD,h) and only one BA (denoted by bL,h) can have claims against him. This
simplification reflects the fact that most HHs are customers of a very limited subset of BAs
and do not lend money from/to the entire set of BAs.7 As long as more than one BA exists, we
assume bD,h 6= bL,h, i.e. h places his deposits and takes credits from different BAs. Otherwise,
the two positions D and L would partially cancel out against one another. We further assume,
for simplicity, that bD,h and bL,h do not change during one simulation.
Following the standard financial reporting rules of the FASB8, equity positions Eb, Eh and
Ecb are given by the residual between assets and liabilities (= net worth). All entries – except
6Compare Cincotti et al. (2010) for a detailed description of the implementation of accounting in a large
scale ACE model.
7Battiston et al. (2012) have noted that credit networks are generally incomplete, i.e. not fully connected
(p. 2).
8“Equity or net assets is the residual interest in the assets of an entity that remains after deducting its
liabilities.” (Financial Accounting Standards Board; 1985, p. 21).
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for equity – have to fulfill a non-negativity constraint. The sum of all individual changes in
assets has to equal that of liabilities. We can use this property to check whether all accounting
operations have been performed correctly, i.e. we will check that
∑
h
dEh +
∑
b
dEb + dEcb = 0
in each time step.
For the ease of exposition, we make use of the common assumption that the interest rate
equals zero.9 We further assume that all BAs equity is initially zero
(
Eb = 0 ∀ b
)
. Eb will
remain unchanged because the interest rate is assumed to be zero.
Process Overview and Scheduling
In our setting, time necessarily comes in discrete steps. To come as close as possible to the
ideal of continuous time, we scale down the length of these time steps by so much that the
model becomes practically continuous. In each (infinitesimal small) time step, the agents are
allowed to make decisions and act.
We assume that agents try to achieve a constant ratio between certain positions of their
balance sheet, e.g. keep cash in a given relation to deposits. Whenever this relationship is
not matched, they take actions in order to reestablish it. In each time step, we check for the
state of every agent and assign one mode to it depending on the relations of its balance sheet
positions. The mode in turn determines the actions the agent undertakes.
5.3.2 Design Concepts
Basic Principles
The basic principle underlying our model is the creation of money. If money is defined as
the sum of cash and deposits owned by HHs, it is created both by the central bank (via
the monetary base) and by the banking sector (via debt/loan contracts). In equilibrium, the
money amount is a multiple of the monetary base. This property of money is well known. But
instead of simply deriving the equilibrium outcome, we show that the equilibrium-benchmark
is the long run result of a disequilibrium process composed of individual interactions.
Emergence
We will only model interactions among individuals in an explicit way: for every single trans-
action, we impose a flow of cash from one specific agent to another. This is also true if a loan
is granted from a BA to a HH.10 Each flow is accounted for in the balance sheets by changing
the agents’ stocks and maybe creating a claim of one against the other. We do not assume the
existence of a credit market with a given set of properties (like equilibrium or monopolistic
9This assumption is common in most macroeconomic ACE models, e.g.: see Russo et al. (2007) and Gaffeo
et al. (2008) for the rate on savings. It could, however, be interesting for future versions of the model to relax
this assumption. E.g. the effects of a positive lending rate on distributional effects between different sectors
can be studied in a dynamic context.
10Implicitly, we assume here that a HH who picks up a loan receives this loan in cash. Alternatively, one
could, at first, increase the HH’s deposits and then convert them into cash (which is needed to buy goods).
For simplicity, we refrain from the latter method since, although it is equivalent to the first method in the end,
it requires more transactions. Additionally, it is unnecessary to invoke transactions between the BA and CB
that would be needed to ensure the reserve requirement (defined below).
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competition). We can, however, interpret the sum of all individual credit contracts as the
credit market. This market is an endogenous object growing out of individual transactions.
It has endogenous properties founded in micro interactions.
Adaptation
The agents in our model act to achieve a given relation between certain positions in their
balance sheet. HHs try to divide their wealth (Ch +Dh) into cash and deposits so that they
are in a fixed relation to each other. If the wealth of a HH is composed, for example, of a too
high share of cash relative to deposits it places further cash in the bank account to match the
target relation. BAs are modeled in a similar way. Instead of matching a given C-D-ratio,
they have to provide required reserves Rb as a given fraction of deposits Db.
Objectives
To keep their behavior as simple as possible, we assume that HHs h want to divide their
wealth up into Ch and Dh so that
Ch = q ·Dh q ∈ [0, 1] (5.1)
holds. Where q is the cash ratio which, for ease of exposition, we assume to be equal among
all HHs. BAs, on the other hand, have to obey a reserve requirement according to
Rb = r ·Db r ∈ [0, 1] (5.2)
where r is the reserve ratio set by the CB. Recall that Db is not the aggregate sum of all HHs’
deposits but only of that subset of HHs for whom bD,h = b holds, i.e. sum of all deposits that
have been placed at BA b. Since our model is a disequilibrium model, we do not assume that
(5.1) and (5.2) hold. Instead, we will define the agents’ behavioral rules such that they strive
to arrive at those relationships. It might be possible, however (e.g. after a liquidity shock by
the CB), that some agents, temporarily, do not meet (5.1) or (5.2), respectively.
Learning
We do not apply a complicate learning procedure for the agents. Instead, we assume, first,
that knowledge is generally local, i.e. agents know their own state variables, but not those of
others. Second, since the positioning of banks on the landscape is not changing over time, we
assume it to be public knowledge. Therefore, HHs do not need to apply a search mechanism
to find a BA.
Interaction
Interactions always take place between two agents. Every interaction induces a flow of cash
from one agent (say A) to another (B): A’s cash entry is reduced by a given amount while B’s is
increased by the same amount. Some transactions (e.g. buying a good) are directly completed
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after the flow of cash from A to B. Other types of transactions (e.g. borrowing/lending) consist
of the commitment to repay later and, additionally, cause the creation of claims of A against
B.
Modeling interactions in such a way assures that all flows between two agents are in line
with the change of their stocks (i.e. are SFC11). It proves a disciplined way to introduce money
into ACE macroeconomics since it obeys a “fundamental law of macroeconomics analogous to
the principle of conservation of energy in physics”12.
Stochasticity
Whenever agents are satisfied with their current state, they do not initiate transactions,
instead, they take a (stochastic) random walk around the landscape. Regarding interactions,
we use pseudo random number generators in two ways. (1) When an agent can choose only
one partner to interact with, he decides by picking randomly. (2) Whenever a BA has excess
reserves (Cb > 0), it offers loans of the highest possible amount ∆Lb = C
b
1+r . If a HH decides to
take a loan from that bank, we determine its demand randomly between the supplied amount
Cb
1+r and a small lower bound value close to zero.
Observation
When running the model, we keep track of the balance sheet of every single agent. For all
positions that denote a claim of one agent against another, we save the amount of that claim
and the two involved agents. Given the set of all individual balance sheets and the way they
are interwoven with one another, we can also calculate different monetary aggregates as the
respective sum of different individual positions.
5.3.3 Details
Initialization
At the beginning, all HHs are randomly distributed over the landscape, while BAs are placed
evenly (Figure 5.1). We initialize all balance sheet entries with zero, i.e. there is no money in
the economy.
Submodels
A HH’s current state of Ch and Dh, straightforwardly, implies three different modes of action:
• HH mode 0 (Ch = q ·Dh): desired cash quota holds exactly, no action required.
• HH mode 1 (Ch < q ·Dh): not enough Cash, transform Dh into Ch.
• HH mode 2 (Ch > q ·Dh): too much Cash, transform Ch into Dh.
11A formal definition of SFC can be found in Patterson and Stephenson (1988) or Taylor (2008).
12Godley and Cripps (1983), p. 14. Found in Bezemer (2010), p. 682.
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Figure 5.1: Initial distribution of agents in space
If Ch = q ·Dh holds for HH h, he enters mode 0. In this mode, there is no need for h to initiate
any transaction. We illustrate this mode by a random walk around the landscape. In the
case of Ch < q ·Dh, he enters mode 1. The HH then directly walks to BA bD,h to withdraw
deposits until mode 0 holds. If, vice versa, Ch > q ·Dh holds (mode 2), h directly walks to bD,h
to place the excess cash in his bank account, i.e. h converts Ch into Dh until mode 0 holds.
A BA never rejects such receipts of liquidity. Figure 5.2 illustrates the decisions of all agents
in a flow chart.
Similarly, we define 3 modes for BAs. All modes follow directly from the assumption that
each BA b has to hold required reserves Rb proportional to the deposits that HHs have placed
on bank accounts of b. The different modes are, thus, given by:
• BA mode 0 (F b = r ·Db): liquidity reserves F b (given by F b = Cb + Rb) match target
value of required reserves r ·Db.
• BA mode 1 (F b > r ·Db): too much liquid funds, grant a credit.
• BA mode 2 (F b < r ·Db): not enough liquid funds, withdraw a credit.
If b’s liquid funds (F b = Cb + Rb) are equal to the reserve requirements, b holds all liquidity
reserves at its account with the CB (Cb = 0 and Rb = r · Db). If eq. (5.2) holds, the bank
enters mode 0, and no further transactions with other agents are initiated by b. If b’s liquid
funds are larger than r · Db, the bank holds Rb = r · Db at its CB account. The remaining
excess reserves are hold in the form of cash (Cb > 0) and a loan is offered to real sector agents
at the amount of C
b
1+r .
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Figure 5.2: Simplified decision structure and interaction of households and banks
If F b < r ·Db holds, the bank, first, transfers all liquid funds into Rb. Second, it withdraws
a loan that has been granted to a HH earlier.13 Practically, this is done by sending a withdraw
credit-signal to one of the HHs that b has a claim on and that is currently in mode 014.
We are aware that, in reality, banks can not simply attain any amount of liquidity in the
short-run by withdrawing credits because they are, in general, not legally allowed to do so
(due to fixed maturities). Additionally, even if they have this opportunity, the borrower might
not have enough liquid funds available (standard maturity transformation problem15). Thus,
banks can only withdraw credits slowly by refusing to renew old ones that become due. This
mechanism is proxied by a simpler one in our model: under normal conditions, a loan runs
forever. If a bank intends to bring outstanding loans down, it can withdraw loans from only
one agent at a time. Additionally, loans are only repaid partially (about 15%, details below).
This simplifies our model a lot, since we do not need to integrate all the thousands of loans
with an individual duration. For simplicity, we also assume that BAs are not punished by
13Recall that all transactions have to be payed with cash.
14Withdrawing only from HHs in mode 0 is a non-restrictive assumption. First, because most of the time
the majority of HHs are in this mode anyhow and, second, because a HH in another mode will return to mode 0
quickly so that the BA can withdraw credits from it. This assumption prevents that an active HH is interrupted
in its current interaction.
15Bank of England (2011)
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the CB if they are unable to supply the reserve requirements. This assumption is relaxed in
Section 5.7.
The three modes we have introduced for the HHs above do not yet allow to take and repay
a loan. We, therefore, have to add three additional modes to close the credit circle.
• HH mode 3: pick up a loan from bL,h.
• HH mode 4: use loan to buy a good from another HH.
• HH mode 5: withdraw credit-signal received.
If BA b offers a loan, one HH of those, who are in mode 0 and for whom bL,h = b holds, gets
informed about the loan offer and enters mode 3. This HH then moves to bL,h and picks up a
loan. We assume that it is offered only to one randomly16 determined HH at the same time.
The amount of that loan (∆Lh) is also randomly determined between the supply C
b
1+r and a
small lower bound17.
After taking a loan, the HH h uses the new liquidity to purchase a good (mode 4). h
randomly walks around the landscape until it meets some other HH (say h¯) who is in mode
0. h buys a good from h¯ and pays with cash. This transaction is accounted for in the
balance sheet of h as a decrease of cash by ∆Lh and an increase of cash in the sheet of h¯.
We are interested in the production and consumption of goods only insofar as it provides a
motivation for taking a credit. We, therefore, assume that h¯ produces the good directly before
the transaction takes place and h consumes it directly thereafter. One can think of this as a
service (e.g. hair cut). This simplification allows us to neglect the real sector and to keep the
flow of goods out of the balance sheets. It seems odd ,at first, that HHs take loans to buy
goods although they still have money left. Households, however, also represent the firm side
of the real sector and with this behavioral assumption, we account for firms’ leveraging.18
If a HH receives a withdraw credit-signal, he enters mode 5 and directly walks to BA bL,h.
Once reached, he transfers cash to the BA until the loan is repaid or until he has no liquid
funds left.
5.4 The Endogenous Creation of Money
In this section, we are going to analyze how private individuals endogenously create money.
We initialize our population as described above with all balance sheet positions set to zero.
The parametrization is given by H = 60, B = 9, q = 0.15 and r = 0.04. As the initial impulse
to the system, we simulate a helicopter drop, i.e. the CB creates 10 units of cash and leaves it
to the HHs. For simplicity, we assume that it is completely given to one randomly determined
16Technically, we determine the random HH by picking that HH with the highest distance to b. Since HHs
take a random walk, picking the one with highest distance to b results in a random choice but assures that a
HH that just repaid a credit (and thus stands next to b) is not directly picked again.
17Technically, this lower bound Lmin = min
{
0.01, C
b
1+r
}
is required to assure convergence towards a steady
state. When a BA reduces its surplus liquidity, its offered loan contracts are also decreasing. The lower bound
assures that a falling Cb does not generate loan contracts that are also converging towards zero.
18To gain further insight into the rationale of borrowing from a management science perspective, see Jensen
(1986), Harris and Raviv (1990) or Stulz (1990).
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HH. This simplification allows us to focus on one individual agent at the beginning of the
simulation since all others remain in mode 0. In later simulations, the helicopter money is
distributed among all HHs. Our concept of endogeneity is different from that in the Post-
Keynesian tradition where the supply of credit is infinitely elastic and hence no exogenous
(helicopter) drop is needed.19 In the paper at hand, the wider monetary aggregates are
produced in an interactive process. Money is, therefore, created by behavioral interactions.
In this sense it is endogenous.
Sheet 4 and 5 illustrate two individual balance sheets immediately after the helicopter
drop. The cash entry of one HH h is increased by 10 which also increases h’s equity by 10. In
the CBs balance sheet the currency position is increased by 10 which induces a fall in equity
by 10.20 Figure 5.3 illustrates part of the landscape. Each agent in the figure has a subscript
showing his two most important assets. These are Ch/Dh for HHs and Cb/Rb for BAs.
0/0
b
❆
❆
❆❯
0/0
10/0
h
❇❇◆
Figure 5.3: Agents at t = 1
Sheet 4: Household h (t = 1)
Assets Liabilities
Cash Loan Bank
10 0
Deposits
0
Equity
10
10 10
Sheet 5: Central bank (t = 1)
Assets Liabilities
Gold Currency
15 10
BA Deposits
0
Equity
5
15 15
In t = 1, all agents are in mode 0 except for h. Obviously, h’s share of cash is too large
compared to (5.1). It, therefore, enters mode 2 and walks in the direction of BA bD,h to place
deposits there.21 After some time steps (t = 300 in our simulation), he reaches bD,h and places
8.70 units of cash in his bank account to satisfy condition (5.1). His balance sheet undergoes
a swap of assets: Ch is reduced by 8.70, while Dh is increased by the same amount (Sheet 6).
In the balance sheet of bank b, this transaction induces an increase of cash by 8.70. Now, b
has a too large amount of liquid funds. It enters mode 1 and deposits r · 8.70 = 0.35 units of
cash as reserve requirements at the CB (Sheet 7). The remaining liquidity (8.35) is offered as
a loan.
The creation of money through lending is obvious from Sheets 4 - 7. While in t = 1 there
are 10 units of money among the private agents (the cash of HH h), there are 18.5 units in
t = 300 (1.3+8.7=10 for HH h plus 8.35 units of cash for BA b).
19A Post-Keynesian version of endogenous money in ACE macroeconomic models can be found in Teglio
et al. (2012).
20We can quickly perform the consistency check mentioned in Section 5.3.1: initially, all agents have zero
equity. After the shock, only those of HH h and the CB change. The sum of all changes in equity in our model,
therefore, equals zero because 10 + (−10) = 0.
21The helicopter drop applied here is basically in line with the traditional Keynesian theory: surplus liquidity
is not used to buy goods (e.g. Pigou effect) but financial securities (here: deposits).
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Figure 5.4: Agents at t = 300
Sheet 6: HH h (t = 300)
Assets Liabilities
Cash Loan Bank
1.30 0
Deposits
8.70
Equity
10
10 10
Sheet 7: Bank b (t = 300)
Assets Liabilities
Cash HH Deposits
8.35 8.70
Reserve
0.35
Credits
0 Equity
0
8.70 8.70
We have now described one transaction in full detail. After this one, there are of course
millions of other transactions following. While the computer program explicitly models all
these transactions in full detail, we can step back and focus our attention on the emergence of
aggregate properties. First of all, we look at the endogenous generation of a network of claims.
Figure 5.5(a) illustrates BAs as black points and HHs as white circles. The first transaction
in t = 300 between h and b has created a claim of h against b. We illustrate this claim as
a link from h to b. Since the other agents have not taken/granted a credit yet, they are not
connected. A second connection is established as soon as b uses the excess reserves to grant
a loan to another household (e.g. h¯), a link from b to h¯ is created.
②
h
h¯
b
(a) in t = 300 (b) in t = 20 000
Figure 5.5: Network of claims (black points denote BAs, circles denote HHs, arrows denote
claims)
As time goes by, more and more individual transactions are carried out. BAs grant more
and more loans to HHs, while HHs increase their possession of deposits. By performing these
transactions, the agents endogenously weave a network of claims on each other. At the same
time, these transactions endogenously produce money. Figure 5.6 shows the development of
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the monetary aggregates over time. BAs transform the monetary base from cash into reserve
requirements (left panel). At the same time, HHs transform cash into deposits and, thus, allow
banks to grant credits. The additional credits strongly increaseM1 (right panel). The process
continues until eq. (5.1) is fulfilled for every HH and (5.2) for every BA. Such a state results
– up to a numerical precision of three digits – around t = 20 000. The monetary aggregates
in this situation are given by M1 ≈ 60.53 and L ≈ 50.53. The market is characterized by a
highly entangled network of credit claims (Figure 5.5(b)). In this state, every HH is connected
to two BAs (bD,h and bL,h).
Figure 5.6: Development of monetary aggregates
Equilibrium Benchmark
The monetary multipliers µ1 and µL that determine the aggregate amount of M1 and L in
equilibrium are given by22
M⋆1 =
1 + q
q + r
·MB = µ1 ·MB with µ1 > 1 (5.3)
and L⋆ =
1− r
q + r
·MB = µL ·MB with µL > 1 (5.4)
For our parametrization, we get µ1 = 6.053 and µL = 5.053. Since the monetary base in our
simulation is given by MB = 10, the equilibrium values of M1 and L are given by M
⋆
1 = 60.53
and L⋆ = 50.53.
Although it is not assumed, the economy converges against the theoretical equilibrium
(M⋆1 and L
⋆) in the long run. Since the agents in our model are of the ZIA type, this proves
that it is the market structure alone (operating in disequilibrium generally) that assures this
convergence (compare Section 5.3.1). We also show that, while the economy moves in the
direction of M⋆1 and L
⋆, it does not only create money but also a strongly interconnected
network of claims.
22A recent discussion about fractional reserve banking (the cause of the money multiplier) can be found in
Mallet (2012).
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Now, that we have demonstrated the creation of money and financial interconnections as a
product of interaction between HHs and BAs, we can introduce the next dimension of credit
markets: interbank lending.
5.5 The Interbank Market
To introduce an interbank market for credits, we augment BAs mode 1 and mode 2. If a
BA enters mode 1, it does, first, offer a credit to other BAs and, second, to HHs. On the
other hand, if a BA enters mode 2, it first tries to bridge the shortage in liquidity by taking a
credit from another BA. If this is not possible, e.g. because no bank has currently a surplus
of liquidity, it withdraws a credit from a HH. To account for interbank credits, we have to
extend the balance sheet of banks by Ib+ (interbank receivables) and I
b
−
(interbank liabilities).
An example is given in sheet 8.
Sheet 8: Example BA b
Assets Liabilities
Cash HH Deposits
Cb Db
Reserve BA Credits
Rb Ib
−
Credits
HH Lb Equity
BA Ib+ E
b
A credit from one bank (say b) to another (b¯) is accounted for by a decrease in Cb and an
increase in C b¯. At the same time, a claim is created by increasing Ib+ and I
b¯
−
by the same
amount. In contrast to credits from BAs to HHs, we assume that credits between BAs can
be carried out immediately and that they have a fixed repay date (trepay = t+ x) in the near
future. The maturity x is randomly determined between 1000 and 2000.23 This assumption
should account for the fact that interbank credits are, typically, granted quicker and over
shorter time horizons than credits to the real sector (Cocco et al. (2009), Demiralp et al.
(2006)).
The creation of money in the previous section followed a monotonic path, i.e. from the
exogenous increase of cash until an equilibrium was reached, the aggregate M1 was never
decreasing. As a result, no HH and no BA has ever encountered a shortage of liquidity (HH
mode 1 and BA mode 2). Interbank lending, however, depends on one BA with a surplus
and another with a shortage of liquidity at the same time. In the following, we extend HHs
behavior in the real sector in order to generate such different liquidity endowments for BAs.
First, we assume that HHs, which are satisfied with their financial position (mode 0) do
not simply stop their economic actions but interact with one another. To introduce such
real market interaction between HHs, we change the above definition of HH’s mode 0 in the
following way.
23Recall, HHs have to walk to their BA (which takes some time) before taking a credit. A fixed repay date
is also not set.
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• Extended HH mode 0 (Ch = q ·Dh): buy/sell goods.
As before, a HH h, for whom Ch = q ·Dh holds, enters mode 0 and takes a random walk around
the landscape. Additionally, he is now looking for transactions with other HHs. As soon as
h encounters another HH (say h¯), who is also in mode 0, one of the two HHs is randomly
determined to be the seller of a good and the other one to be the buyer. The price p is also
randomly determined between 50% of the buyer’s cash and zero. Ch is reduced by p while
C h¯ is increased by the same amount. As before, we assume (for ease of exposition) that the
exchanged good does not enter the balance sheet.
This transaction causes one HH to enter mode 1 and the other to enter mode 2. The first
will convert deposits into cash, while the second will transfer cash into deposits. As a result,
BA bD,h will end up with a shortage of liquidity and bD,h¯ with a surplus. Of course, this
(random) behavior is not particularly realistic. But since we are only interested in the impact
of real sector transactions on the credit market, this way of modeling is sufficient for our
purpose because it serves as a means for interbank lending.24
It is theoretically possible now that a BA b is not able to fulfill its debt obligations if, for
example, some HHs demand liquidity from it over a short period of time and no other BA
has a surplus of liquidity to grant a credit. Recall that b is never able to withdraw credits
immediately to obtain liquidity. We, therefore, have to define how agents behave in such a
case. For simplicity, we assume that, as soon as a BA b is not able to fulfill an obligation, it
becomes public knowledge that it is insolvent. All HHs, who have deposits at it, immediately
withdraw as much of them as possible (bank run) and no other BA will grant further credits to
it. After a period of insolvency proceedings with randomly determined length up to 2000 time
steps, the insolvent BA is removed. All remaining balance sheet positions are depreciated and
those HHs for whom bD,h = b holds will pick another solvent BA for placing their deposits.
Now that the interbank market is introduced, we will perform some simulations of the
extended model.
5.6 Endogenous Instability
To analyze the impact of interbank lending on the credit market, we run a new simulation.
Initially, all agents’ balance sheet positions are again set to zero. We introduce money by an
exogenous helicopter drop of 100 cash units that are equally distributed among HHs.
As in Section 5.4, we find that money is endogenously created over time (see Figure 5.7).
But now, the economy does not smoothly approach an equilibrium and settle down there.
Instead, when the market gets close to equilibrium (e.g. t = 20 000, ..., 32 000), we observe
small unsystematic fluctuations (see zoom window) that emerge as a result of random trading.
During such a period, one often finds a BA that is in mode 1 and simultaneously another BA in
mode 2.25 Consequently, there are a lot of interbank credits being granted during such times.
24Lenzu and Tedeschi (2011) use a similar mechanism and apply exogenous shocks that reduce the liquidity
of one BA and at the same time increase that of another (p. 8).
25Recall, that this was impossible in the simulation of Section 5.4 because of the monotonic increase in M1.
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Figure 5.7: Development of monetary ag-
gregates with interbank market
Figure 5.8: Network of claims with inter-
bank market at t = 20 000
Now that BAs lend to each other, they are also directly linked by credit relations (illustrated
as black lines in Figure 5.8). Interconnectedness of the network of claims will, thus, be higher.
Around t = 33 000 one BA becomes insolvent and has to leave the market. As a result,
the deposits of some HHs and the interbank credits of some BAs are destroyed which lets
the money amount drop. This destruction of money leads to a shortage of liquidity that
drives another bank into insolvency shortly thereafter. Again, money is destroyed which is
illustrated as a second drop in the monetary aggregates about 500 periods later.
Figure 5.9: Example of the number of operating BAs over time if no BA survives (left) and
if one BA survives (right).
Although, BA failures do occur now, convergence to the close neighborhood of the bench-
mark equilibrium (5.3) and (5.4) is still assured as long as, at least, one BA is present. Only
if all BAs fail (no BA survives a bankruptcy cascade), endogenous money creation is not
possible anymore. Two situations are possible as absorbing states of the system: (1) all BAs
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have become bankrupt (Figure 5.9, left panel, at period ≈ 4.8 · 104). In this case, higher
monetary aggregates cannot be created and the benchmark equilibrium cannot be reached.
(2) one BA survives the last bankruptcy chain (Figure 5.9, right panel, at period ≈ 4.3 · 104).
In this case, the benchmark equilibrium will still be reached. Such a state can never break
down since a single BA cannot suffer large withdraws of liquidity in our model. Recall that
liquidity withdraws are created by random transactions between two HHs that always result
in one HH (the seller) with surplus liquidity and one (buyer) with a lack of liquidity. The for-
mer will increase its deposits, while the latter will withdraw cash. Since both are necessarily
customers of the same BA (because there is only one left), their transactions will cancel out
in the BA’s balance sheet.
Running an MC experiment, we found that the model ends up in the first state with a
probability of 73.7% and in the second with a probability of 26.3%. The impression might arise
that the banking sector in our model is extreamly fragile because of these high probabilities.
Therefore we want to stress that the above probabilities are a natural result in our setting. If
the probability of single BA failure in each period is small but postive and the entry of new
BAs is not allowed, the number of BAs is neccessarily decreasing over time until an absorbing
state is reached. The probability of reaching either state 1 or 2 in the very long run therefore
has to be 100%. Since these very long run absorbing states are of minor economic importance
we neglect them in the remainder of this paper and focus on short-run stabilization.
The Cause of Bankruptcies
To explain the chain of events that drives BAs into bankruptcy, we have to leave the macro
level of aggregates and markets and enter the micro level of single agents and interactions.
For illustration purpose, we pick one BA (say b) at t = 20 000 and look at its balance sheet
(Sheet 9). At this point in time, b has liquid funds equal to Cb + Rb = 3.01. As stated
above, interbank credits have a fixed repay date. We can, therefore, create a liquidity forecast
for b based on the current liquidity and its future change by due credits. Figure 5.10 shows
such a forecast for the subsequent 2000 periods. For the current time step (k = 0) it starts
at 3.01. For k = 1, ..., 2000 it decreases if b has to repay credits and increases if b receives
credit repayments from other BAs. Since interbank credits on the assets and liabilities side
are almost equal (25.82 ≈ 25.83), the cash forecast ends up where it started (near 3).26
Bank b has a very robust financial position. Comparing with another bank (say b¯) at
the same point in time, we find a very different picture. Sheet 10 and Figure 5.11 illustrate
the situation of b¯. The liquidity forecast starts at C b¯ + Rb¯ = 2.17. It follows a downward
trend because the bank has taken much more credits from other BAs than it has granted
(35.26 > 28.15). Around k = 600, the liquidity forecast falls below zero. In this situation,
b¯ will not be able to fulfill its debt obligations. Note, however, that this insolvency is not a
result of too low equity. The value of equity is zero from the beginning on since nothing is
added or removed from it. It results simply because cash in- and outflows are asynchronous.
26Liquidity of 3.01 plus repayments from other BAs of 25.82 minus repayments to other BAs of 25.83 result
in 3.00.
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Sheet 9: Bank b, t = 20 000
Assets Liabilities
Cash HH Deposits
0.01 75.01
Reserve BA Credits
3.00 25.83
Credits
HH 72.01 Equity
BA 25.82 0.00
100.84 100.84
Figure 5.10: Liquidity forecast for b, t =
20 000 ... 22 000
Sheet 10: Bank b¯, t = 20 000
Assets Liabilities
Cash HH Deposits
0.1 52.2
Reserve BA Credits
2.07 35.26
Credits
HH 57.14 Equity
BA 28.15 0
87.46 87.46
Figure 5.11: Liquidity forecast for b¯, t =
20 000 ... 22 000
Recall that the described situation is just a snapshot in t = 20 000. What will happen as
time goes by? BA b¯ will repay credits and its liquid funds will decrease. Therefore, it will
enter mode 2 and try to attain new liquidity (e.g. new credits from other BAs or withdraw
loans from HHs). If b¯ is successful (e.g. in raising new credits) until t = 20 600, it does not
become insolvent but, instead, rolls it’s debt position over. The process can continue and b¯
can stay in the market. At some future point in time (t = 33 000), it might happen that, first,
no other BA has the necessary surplus in liquidity and, second, the HHs, who borrowed from
b¯, are not able to repay as quick27 as b¯ needs cash. Therefore, b¯ is unable to roll over the debt
position and becomes insolvent. Other agents withdraw as much credits and deposits from b¯
as possible which makes the endogenously produced money amount fall (Figure 5.7). After
the randomly determined length of the insolvency proceedings, b is removed and all claims
against it become worthless. Other BAs, which are also in a weak financial position or who
have lent to b¯ and depend on repayment, will also be in trouble now and eventually become
insolvent. A bankruptcy cascade might follow.
27Recall, that we have assumed in Section 5.3 that withdrawing credits from the real sector can not be done
immediately but takes time.
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Figure 5.12: Liquidity forecasts of two lenders of b¯ with and without the depreciation of credits
to b¯
We can illustrate the spillover of this cascade by looking at two lenders of b¯ (Figure 5.12).
Both have a robust financial position: the liquidity forecast of the first one is almost a hor-
izontal line, while that of the second has a slight upward trend (no depreciation case). If b¯
becomes insolvent, it is not able to pay all of its credits back. Consequently, the two lenders
will not receive all of the granted credits back. The depreciation line shows the same liquidity
forecasts but with all credits to b¯ depreciated, i.e. the development of liquid funds if no credit
from b¯ is repaid. The insolvency of b¯ moves liquidity forecasts downward. Both BAs will,
therefore, also be financially less robust. They withdraw credits and grant less to other BAs
which can drive further BAs into insolvency and so on.
In our simulation, the crisis is spread by the non-performance of interbank debt. But the
argument is general enough to be extended to any depreciation of bad debt. Regarding the
current developments in southern Europe, for example, it is intuitively clear that a depreci-
ation of bad government bonds has exactly the same effect on banks’ liquidity position and
can, therefore, also trigger a bankruptcy cascade among BAs.
We can identify instability as an emerging property of the aggregate that stems from
asynchronous in- and outflows of liquidity created by individual transactions. The liquidity
requirements of a failing BA, in turn, creates the risk of contagion. This result casts serious
doubt on the value of general equilibrium modeling, since all interesting behavior is observed
outside of equilibrium. For example, the question under what conditions a banking sector
brakes down or what the government or CB can do to stop a bankruptcy cascade cannot be
answered if we restrict ourselves to equilibrium.
To evaluate the threat of systemic risk, we perform a Monte Carlo experiment with 2000
runs of the model. Results are shown in table 5.1. The start-column gives the probability
that, conditional on the amount of interbank credits in a period t, a first bank will fail in the
near future (i.e. until t + 800). The other columns give the conditional probability that, if
a failure has been observed in t, a further bank will fail until t + 800. In other words, the
start-column contains the probability that a crisis starts and the other columns those that it
spreads to a further BA.
First of all, we find that the amount of interbank credits monotonically increases the
probability to fail. This effect is obviously a result of a stronger entangled web of claims. If
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a BA has taken more credits from others, it becomes more likely that these credits can not
be payed back. Or, vice versa, the more credits a BA has granted, the more assets it has
to depreciate if its borrowers fail. As a consequence, debt growth is a central factor that
originates financial instability.28
Table 5.1: Conditional probabilities to become insolvent
Recent BA failures
IB Credits start 1 2 3 4 5 > 5
0-200 0 0.04 0 0 0 0 0
200-400 0.02 0.22 0.21 0.11 0.09 0.05 0.12
400-600 0.17 0.62 0.73 0.51 0.52 0.42 0.35
600-800 0.56 0.93 0.93 0.84 0.77 0.72 0.61
> 800 0.88 0.99 0.99 0.94 0.84 0.77 0.75
We also find that the probability to observe a bankruptcy is much higher if there have been
bankruptcies before. E.g. assume the system is in a state where interbank credits are between
400 and 600. In this state, the probability that an initial BA will fail is 0.17. But if one BA
has already failed before, this probability increases to 0.62. If two BAs have failed before,
it increases to 0.73. We can, therefore, identify a clear contagion effect of bankruptcies.
This effect, however, is non-monotonic, i.e. probabilities are first increasing the more BAs
have failed, but decreasing later on. In the case of IB credits > 800, it even falls below the
probability that a crisis is started. The economic rationale for this non-monotonicity is the
following: as soon as the first BAs are removed from the market, there are some HHs who have
withdrawn as much deposits as possible from those BAs and consequently hold their wealth
in cash only. Those households will pick another solvent BA for depositing part of their cash.
Thus, they will provide further liquidity to the liquid BAs which will help to stabilize those.
This behavior will bifurcate the economy. Money is withdrawn from the insolvent BAs and
given to the solvent ones. The downside is that the latter will be in excess of liquidity but
will not provide it to the former. The upside is, that such behavior protects the healthy BAs
by reducing their probability to fail and, thus, helps to stop a cascade.29
Table 5.2: Conditional probabilities to become insolvent
Recent BA Breakdowns
IB Market start 1 2 3 4 5 > 5
Off 0.04 0.14 0.23 0.22 0.09 0 0
On 0.02 0.78 0.9 0.8 0.72 0.59 0.4
We can now analyze the effect of an interbank market on the emergence of systemic risk.
We perform another Monte Carlo simulation with the interbank market turned off, so that
28This point is also in line with Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis. Compare Minsky (1977), Minsky
(1978) as well as Godley and Lavoie (2007) or Bezemer (2012a).
29A similar idea of bifurcation can be found in Leijonhufvud (2012).
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the model equals the baseline version of the previous sections again. Table 5.2 compares the
probabilities to fail, conditional on the existence of an interbank market. Firstly, we find that
the probability of a first bank to fail is very small in both scenarios. The banking sector is,
therefore, very stable under normal conditions. With no interbank market, the probability
is only 0.04. If an interbank market exists, it even decreases to 0.02. The existence of an
interbank market, therefore, stabilizes the banking sector because of the improved possibilities
for BAs to refinance.
Secondly, we find that the probabilities of contagion are much higher if an interbank market
exists (e.g. 0.78 ≫ 0.14). The impact of an interbank market is, therefore, twofold. It
stabilizes the banking sector under normal conditions but strongly increases systemic risk.30
Interestingly, the probabilities of contagion do not become zero if the interbank market is
turned off. Therefore, the interbank market amplifies but does not create systemic risk.
If one BA becomes bankrupt, it starts withdrawing as much credits from HHs as possible.
These HHs, in turn, withdraw deposits from other BAs. These other BAs might, thus, also be
driven into liquidity problems and might ultimately become insolvent. Bankruptcy cascades
can, thus, also be transmitted by HHs if BAs are not directly connected by an interbank
market.
The probability of observing a total breakdown of the banking sector where all BAs fail in
one single cascade is positive and results from multiplying all probabilities in one row. In the
case of an interbank market this probability becomes 0.02 · 0.78 · ... ≈ 0.00011, without an
interbank market it becomes zero.
One strength of ACE modeling is that parameter heterogeneity can be directly introduced.
We can, therefore, easily check whether our results are robust against assumption of parameter
heterogeneity among agents. Instead of setting q = 0.15 for all HHs, we draw the individual
qh from a uniform distribution with support [0.1, 0.2], i.e. qh ∼ U(0.1, 0.2). Since the
reserve requirement is set by the CB, we do not assume heterogeneity among the parameter r.
Repeating the Monte Carlo exercise shows that the above results are stable against parameter
heterogeneity (results are not shown).
In another experiment, we analyze the role of large (systemically important) banks. We
perform 500 independent simulations with different underlying random seeds. To calculate
the impact of bank concentration on stability, we calculate (for each simulation i) the number
of BAs that survive 40000 ticks Yi as a proxy of stability and different concentration measures
Xi in the time step before the first BA becomes bankrupt. The size of each BA is proxied by
its balance sheet size. In five regressions of the form
Yi = β0 + β1 ·Xi, (5.5)
our stability proxy Yi is regressed on one concentration measure Xi. Since regression results
are going to depend on the way concentration is measured, we directly check the robustness
of our estimation by using five different measures: size of the largest BA, standard deviation
30This result is in line with Farmer et al. (2012), p. 14: “[...] interbank lending [...] can provide security in
normal times but may amplify the extend of a crash in bad times.”
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of BA size, Herfindahl index, Theil’s index and Gini coefficient. Estimation results for β1 and
the corresponding p-values are shown in table 5.3. All estimates suggest that the influence of
concentration (i.e. the existence of large BAs) on stability is negative. This effect is robust over
all applied concentration measures. Since Xi is located on a very different interval depending
on the underlying index, we are not able to compare the different estimates of β1 directly. To
be able to compare the estimates quantitatively, we calculate the percentage change in stability
∆Y
Y
that is induced by a one percent change in the stability measure X in an economy with
average concentration X = 1500
∑
iXi (last row of table 5.3). Our calculations show that a
1% increase in concentration is roughly followed by a stability decrease between 0.11% and
0.99%.
Table 5.3: The effect of concentration on stability
Xi Largest Std HHI Theil Gini
βˆ1 -0.016 -0.039 -26.9 -0.5 -3.9
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.004 0.014
∆Y
Y
if ∆X
X
= 1% -0.88% -0.51% -0.99% -0.11% -0.22%
To check the robustness of our findings against different measures of stability, we perform an
estimation of a binary choice probit. As explaining variable, we use the same five concentration
measures as before while the endogenous (binary) event Yi = 1 is now given by the occurrence
of a total breakdown of our economy.31 All qualitative results still hold under the changed
specifications: estimators and marginal effects are positive (table 5.4). Since it is again difficult
to compare the obtained marginal effects in a quantitative way, we calculate the implied change
in probability for a total breakdown to occur given a 1% change in concentration. Our results
(last row of table 5.4) show that an increase in BA concentration by 1% is followed by an
increase in the probability of a total breakdown between 0.06% and 0.61%.
Table 5.4: The effect of concentration on total breakdowns
Xi Largest Std HHI Theil Gini
βˆ1 0.0078 0.0199 16.92 0.294 2.38
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.007 0.021
marginal effects 0.0022 0.0056 4.87 0.084 0.686
∆Prob(Y = 1) if ∆X
X
= 1% 0.41% 0.25% 0.61% 0.06% 0.13%
From this section, we can robustly conclude that a financial sector composed of equally
sized BAs is more stable than one composed of BAs with strongly differing size. In Section
5.7, we come back to this result and show that regulatory policy should regulate large BAs
over-proportionately strong to counteract on the instability they create.
31We define a total breakdown as a situation in which only one or less BAs survive because in such a situation
no further bank failures are possible.
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An Aggregate Perspective
The strength of ACE modeling is that it allows for a completely disaggregated view on the
economy. This advantage can be pointed out by asking ourselves how the previous simulations
of this section would have looked like if one does not have access to individual information
in the simulation but only to aggregates. For example, if we would only have the sum of all
individual HHs as the household sector that is “representing” all its constituting individuals
and only the sum of all BAs as the banking sector.
Sheet 11: Household sector
Assets Liabilities
Cash Loan Bank
79.99 492.65
Deposits
512.66
Equity
100
592.65 592.65
Sheet 12: Banking sector
Assets Liabilities
Cash HH Deposits
0.00 512.66
Reserve BA Credits
20.01 0
Credits
HH 492.65 Equity
BA 0 0
512.66 512.66
Sheets 11, 12 and 13 show the situation of the above simulation at t = 20 000 from an
accounting perspective. First of all, the three balance sheets look qualitatively identical to the
ones before. But there is an important difference in the balance sheet of the banking sector.
Since every interbank credit appears on the assets side of one bank and the liabilities’ side of
another, it cancels out in the aggregate (I+ = I− = 0). Interbank lending, therefore, simply
disappears on the aggregate level (Sheet 12). This becomes evident by looking at the cash
forecast of the banking sector (Figure 5.13). Since all committed repayments of interbank
loans induce a positive flow for one bank and a negative flow for another, they also cancel out
on the aggregate and the cash forecast becomes a horizontal line. Since this horizontal line can
impossibly intersect with the horizontal-axis, we are not able to see the event of insolvency as
a result of maturity mismatch. At the same time, we are unable to picture the credit market
as an endogenous network but only as the relation between two aggregate representatives in
isolation (Figure 5.14). An event, like agent A withdrawing credits from B which forces B to
withdraw from C and so on (i.e. a bankruptcy cascade through the web transmitted by the
individual need for liquidity), is simply impossible when dealing with aggregates.
Sheet 13: Central bank
Assets Liabilities
Gold Currency
150 79.99
BA Deposits
20.01
Equity
50
150 150
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Figure 5.13: Liquidity forecast for banking sector,
t = 20 000 ... 22 000
Figure 5.14: Network of claims on ag-
gregate level, t = 20 000
These considerations make clear why it is problematic to deal with aggregates directly, even
if they are sums of heterogeneous individuals or SFC. Financial instability is neither deducible
from the behavior of a single individual in isolation nor from the aggregate of all (maybe
heterogeneous) individuals. These considerations illustrate why it is not sufficient to replace
the rational representative agent by a non-rational one,32 or to introduce heterogeneity among
some kinds of agents, sum them up and confront the resulting sums of supply and demand
with the other side of the market. How maturity mismatches create systemic financial risk
can only be understood in an individual and interaction based analysis with a consistent
accounting structure.
5.7 Standing Facilities, Reserve Requirements and Regulatory
Policy
In this section, we extend our framework by allowing BAs to receive liquidity from the CB
via standing facilities. We assume that BAs can, by its own initiative, place a secure asset
(e.g. AAA bonds) at the CB to obtain liquidity. Technically, the CB and each BA are given
a new position on its assets’ side S (compare Sheets 14 and 15) that denotes the amount of
such assets they possess. If a BA makes use of standing facilities, we add a positive value
to its account at the CB Rb, subtract the same value from its bonds Sb, add it to the CB’s
bonds Scb and create a liability for the CB against the BA by increasing Rcb.
For simplicity, we control the initial endowment of save assets exogenously. Since all
balance sheet entries are initially zero, the equity position of banks becomes equal to their
initial endowment of assets. Additionally, we assume that each BA is now forced by the CB
32As done, for example, in the literature on learning. Compare Evans and Honkapohja (2001) or Adam
(2005) among others.
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Sheet 14: BA b with secure assets
Assets Liabilities
Cash HH Deposits
Cb Db
Reserve BA Credits
Rb Ib
−
Credits
HH Lb
BA Ib+
AAA Bonds Equity
Sb Eb
Sheet 15: CB with secure assets
Assets Liabilities
AAA Bonds Currency
Scb Ccb
BA Deposits
Rcb
Equity
Ecb
to hold Rb at the amount given by (5.2). Similar to all other non-fulfilled obligations, we
declare a BA bankrupt as soon as it fails to provide the required reserves.33
Microprudential Bank Regulation
The Bank of International Settlements has published new regulatory rules for commercial
banks in December 2010 (known as Basel III) with the aim of increasing the stability of the
financial sector. Among others, the new guide lines strengthen the capital requirements as
they increase the core capital quota (CCQ), which is defined as the minimum ratio of core
equity capital that a bank has to hold in relation to its risk weighted assets, from 2% to
7%.34 In this subsection, we use our model to analyze the implications of Basel III CCQ
requirements on aggregate stability. For simplicity, we assume Lb to be the part of BA assets
that the regulator has defined to be risky. The CCQ is, thus, given by:
CCQb =
Eb
Lb
(5.6)
To determine the impact different CCQ regulatory settings have on stability, we perform the
following experiment:35
1. Perform one simulation for a given endowment of secure assets S1, S2, ...SB with random
trading turned off to obtain a steady state benchmark.
2. Perform the same simulation with random trading turned on for 1000 different realiza-
tions of the random number generator.
3. Repeat step 1 and 2 for different endowments with save assets.
33In previous examples BAs where able to buffer shortages of liquidity by bringing down reserves at the CB
without ever being punished. Introducing standing facilities, would strongly increase stability, because BAs
are just given an additional liquidity buffer (reserve requirements + AAA bonds). E.g. increasing AAA bonds
from 0 to 8 would result in an increase in stability Yi (compare p. 73) from 3.6 to 4.8. By assuming that reserve
requirements are mandatory, we replace the previously used reserves-buffer by a AAA-bonds-buffer.
34We neglect here that there is also a cyclical component in the CCQ requirement that allow banks to fall
below 7% for some time to buffer the credit contraction that appears typically during recessions.
35Computationally, these steps are already (despite the model’s simplicity) very involved. We have run the
simulations from this section in parallel on a high-performance Linux-Cluster. Running them on a standard
desktop computer would have taken about one week.
5. MONEY CREATION AND FINANCIAL INSTABILITY 78
The endowment with save assets is controlled in two ways. First, we vary the sum SAggr =∑
b S
b of all BAs to control for the impact of larger capital requirements in general. Second,
we control for the initial distribution of Sb among BAs according to their size. A similar
aspect can be found in Basel III where higher CCQs are set for banks that are declared as
systemically relevant.36 Let save assets of b be given by
Sb = S
Aggr size
α
b∑B
i=1 size
α
i
(5.7)
where the size of a BA (sizeb) is now given by the amount of loans to HHs (obtained from
the benchmark simulation). By defining sizeb this way, the baseline case (α = 1) results in
a distribution of assets that is proportional to BA’s loans and, hence, CCQs that are equal
among banks. In case α = 0, the absolute endowment of Sb is equal among banks. In this
case, small BAs face larger CCQs than large ones. The opposite holds for α > 1, where CCQs
will be larger for big BAs.
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Figure 5.15: Impact of different CCQ regulations on stability
To illustrate the influence of banks’ capital basis on systemic risk, we plot the average
steady state CCQ obtained from step 1 against the average relative number of BAs that
survive the first 40000 periods in step 2 (Figure 5.15). The results are in line with Hannoun
(2010), Allen et al. (2012) and also Arnold et al. (2012) who state that banks’ capital basis
were too low in the pre-crisis period, i.e. we show that a larger capital basis (larger CCQ) has
a positive effect on stability. The intention of Basel III to increase stability by forcing banks
to increase their CCQ from 2% to 7% is, thus, confirmed.
Additionally, we find that a higher value of α results in a more stable banking sector.
Comparing, for example, the Basel III setting of 7% CCQ for different values of α shows that
higher values of α result in a more stable financial sector, e.g. stability increases from 35 to 56
if α is increased from 0 to 2. Regulating large banks more strictly than small ones (as Basel
36Compare BCBS (2011).
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III already does, see BCBS (2011)) has a positive effect on stability, although the average
CCQ has not changed.
5.8 Conclusion
We present an ACE model of the credit and interbank market. The only two different kinds
of agents it consists of are household/firms and banks, both of which follow very simple
behavioral rules. We show how money is produced in the banking sector (as a multiple of
the monetary base) through individual interactions in a disequilibrium process. Our model
is a generalization of standard theory since it contains the common equilibrium result as a
limiting case.
We also show that the creation of money inevitably produces instability. When applying
a perspective that is strictly individual based and SFC, it is impossible to make sense of
endogenous money without a web of claims between agents. This web, however, produces
the threat of systemic risk. Instability is, therefore, systematically produced in monetary
economies and can not be put aside as an exogenous shock or a friction.
Additionally, we show that the banking sector is more stable if it is composed of equally
sized banks. The existence of large banks creates endogenous instability. As a consequence,
regulatory policy should be more restrictive for such large banks compared to small ones.
The model can also be used to answer further policy relevant questions. For instance, the
capital and liquidity requirements proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
aims to mitigate the subsequent destabilizing effects of a spreading/growing credit network
on the economy since they have been identified as key drivers of financial instability. Hence,
it would be worthwhile to analyze in what way the implementation of the complete spectrum
of the Basel III regulatory framework (apart from just CCQ) would affect the outcome of
the model in terms of bank defaults. Furthermore, the effects of single and simultaneous
requirements as well as the impact of pure micro- or macroprudential instruments could be
compared.
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Abstract
The Basel III accord reacts to the events of the recent financial crisis with a combination of
revised micro- and new macroprudential regulatory instruments to address various dimensions
of systemic risk. This approach of cumulating requirements bears the risk of individual mea-
sures negating or even conflicting with each other which might lessen their desired effects on
financial stability. We provide an analysis of the impact of Basel III’s main components on fi-
nancial stability in a stock-flow consistent (SFC) agent-based computational economic (ACE)
model. We find that the positive joint impact of the microprudential instruments is consid-
erably larger than the sum of the individual contributions to stability, i.e. the standalone
impacts are non-additive. However, except for the buffers, the macroprudential overlay’s im-
pact is either marginal or even destabilizing. Despite its simplicity, the leverage ratio performs
poorly especially when associated drawbacks are explicitly taken into account. Surcharges on
SIBs seem to rather contribute to financial regulations complexity than to the resilience of
the system.
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Chapter 7
Outlook and Future Research
In chapter 2 and 3 we develop a model describing the interactions between financial markets
and the real economy. The model was used to answer several policy-relevant questions. With
respect to internal validation, the presented model is superior to its competitors since its
interactive channels are microfounded and not assumed ad hoc. Future research, however,
has to clarify which of the proposed channels are empirically most relevant to also provide
external validation.
While a detailed analysis of optimal policy rules under commitment has been performed,
the treatment of optimal unrestricted policies and monetary policy under discretion had to be
postponed. Future research should clarify to what extend the well-known results of optimal
monetary policy hold, if rational expectations are relaxed in advance of bounded rationality.
We have demonstrated that the model is not only capable of analyzing the standard ques-
tions of monetary policy (e.g. derive optimal simple rules). It can also be used to answer
several questions that are currently on the political agenda: First, we have derived optimal
taxation of financial transactions. Second, we have shown that even results concerning opti-
mal unconventional policy can be derived straight forwardly. Given the current developments
of monetary policy in Europe, the latter is of major importance for practical considerations.
Future research should further investigate the potential strengths and drawbacks of applying
unconventional monetary instruments.
The model, developed in chapter 4 contributes to macroeconomic theory, because it allows
for a modeling methodology that corrects most of the criticism that has been drawn against
the DSGE paradigm. At the same time it is much simpler than other macroeconomic models
of the ACE type.
The major drawback of the presented model is, that empirical remarks have only been used
to validate the ACE model. The confrontation with DSGE has been done on a theoretical
level only. Although this confrontation is important, since most of the currently expressed
criticism is concerned with theoretical problems, future research has to compare ACE and
DSGE in quantitative terms also (e.g. forecasting accuracy).
For a better acceptance of the ACE method in macroeconomics, two further steps have
to be taken in future research: First, it has to be shown that all the standard question (e.g.
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optimal monetary policy, size of fiscal multipliers, etc.) can be answered satisfactorily in ACE
models. Second, the model complexity has to be reduced even further. Current ACE modeling
in macroeconomics is relatively complicated (theoretically, but also technically). Building such
models, therefore, implies high costs to economists of typical educational background. The
practical implementation of ACE macroeconomic models has to become simpler if a paradigm
shift is aspired.
The model presented in chapter 5 can be seen as a further step in this direction. The
model mimics closely the text-book approach to money creation (low theoretical burden). At
the same time it is written in a programming framework which is easy to learn, NetLogo, and
can be accessed by students easily like a computer game (low practical burden). In chapter 6
we demonstrate that, although simple, the model can be used to answer important, currently
discussed policy questions. It is thus worth exploring further.
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